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FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA

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CHAPTER I.

THE AFRIDI TRIBE.

Khaibar and Aka Khel Afridis.

THE Afridis are a large tribe, inhabiting the lower and easternmost spurs of the Safed Koh range, to the west and south of the Peshawar district, including the Bazar and Bara valleys. On their east they are bounded by British territory; on their north they have the Mohmands; west, the Shinwaris; and south, the Orakzais and Bangash.

The origin of this tribe, owing to want of written records, is very obscure, but all authorities are agreed to divide them into the following clans:—

- | | |
|-------------------|----------------|
| 1. Kuki Khel. | 5. Zakha Khel. |
| 2. Malikdin Khel. | 6. Sipah. |
| 3. Kambar Khel. | 7. Aka Khel. |
| 4. Kamrai. | 8. Adam Khel. |

The first six of these clans are known collectively as the Khaibar Afridis. The Aka Khels have no connection with the Khaibar, and are located to the south of the Bara river. The Adam Khels inhabit the hills between the districts of Kohat and Peshawar, and cannot be regarded as a part of the Afridi tribe in any other than an ethnological point of view; for, whether they are viewed with reference to their position, their interests, or their habits, they are a distinct community. The consideration of this clan will therefore be reserved for a separate chapter, the subject of the present chapter being the Khaibar and Aka Khel Afridis.

The Afridi in appearance is generally a fine, tall, athletic highlander, whose springy step, even in traversing the dusty streets of Peshawar, at once denotes his mountain origin. They are lean but muscular men, with long, gaunt faces, high noses and

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CHAPTER I.

THE AFRIDI TRIBE.

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THE Afridis are a large tribe, inhabiting the lower and easternmost spurs of the Safed Koh range, to the west and south of the Peshawar district, including the Bazar and Bara valleys. On their east they are bounded by British territory ; on their north they have the Mohmands ; west, the Shinwaris ; and south, the Orakzais and Bangash.

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|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. <i>Kaki Khel.</i> | 5. <i>Zakha Khel.</i> |
| 2. <i>Malikdīn Khel.</i> | 6. <i>Sipah.</i> |
| 3. <i>Kambar Khel.</i> | 7. <i>Aka Khel.</i> |
| 4. <i>Kamrai.</i> | 8. <i>Adam Khel.</i> |

The first six of these clans are known collectively as the Khaibar Afridis. The Aka Khels have no connection with the Khaibar, and are located to the south of the Bara river. The Adam Khels inhabit the hills between the districts of Kohat and Peshawar, and cannot be regarded as a part of the Afridi tribe in any other than an ethnological point of view ; for, whether they are viewed with reference to their position, their interests, or their habits, they are a distinct community. The consideration of this clan will therefore be reserved for a separate chapter, the subject of the present chapter being the Khaibar and Aka Khel Afridis.

The Afridi in appearance is generally a fine, tall, athletic highlander, whose springy step, even in traversing the dusty streets of Peshawar, at once denotes his mountain origin. They are lean but muscular men, with long, gaunt faces, high noses and

cheek-bones, and rather fair complexions. Brave and hardy, they make good soldiers, but are apt to be somewhat homesick withal. They are careful shots and skirmishers, waiting with the greatest patience for the chance of an easy shot at an enemy. This quality

Fighting qualities of the Afridis. is less shown when, as soldiers of the British Government, they are supplied with unlimited ammunition, but still their *spécialité* is hill fighting. Generally speaking, there is no doubt that the Afridis are now better armed than they have ever been; almost every fighting man possesses a rifle of some sort, and a great number have weapons of the very latest pattern.

The sources of supply of these rifles are various. The best in their possession are Government rifles stolen from our troops, of which, in spite of all precautions, a considerable number find their way across the frontier every year. Every kind of ingenious device has been used to smuggle the stolen weapons across the border. Some years ago a coffin, in which apparently some Pathans were

Rifle smuggling. taking the remains of a dead fellow-countryman back to his native land for interment, became an object of suspicion to the police. In spite of the protestations of the heart-broken relatives, the police insisted upon opening it, and found that, instead of a corpse, it was full of stolen rifles. According to official returns, no less than 1,250 breech-loading rifles (of which only $\frac{1}{2}$ have been recovered) were stolen from our troops in the fifteen years ending in 1900; and there is every reason to believe that the great majority of these found their way into the hands of the Afridis and other tribes on the Peshawar border. In addition to the above, a few Kabul-made weapons have been stolen from the Amir's regular troops; and the factories at Maidan in Tirah, at Ilamgudar, in the Sipah country, a short distance beyond Fort Bara, and in the Kohat pass, (where the Adam Khel have half a dozen factories), annually turn out a number of rifles, which, though inferior to those of English manufacture, are far better than the *jézails* and matchlocks of long ago. Of 1,497 rifles surrendered in 1897-98, 245 were classed as "stolen" (i.e., stolen complete), 130 as "foreign" (of which 87 were from Kabul, 77 being Sniders), and 1,122 as "made up".

The great skill shown of recent years in the use of fire-arms by the tribesmen may be accounted for by the very large number of pensioners and reservists who have served in our own regiments; the higher standard of skill and knowledge now demanded in our army being naturally disseminated to a greater extent than formerly amongst the tribesmen by these pensioners and reservists on their return to their own country on the conclusion of their military service. The establishments of our native regiments contain over 2,000 men recruited from the Afridi tribes alone, and as the Pathan is notoriously restless and dislikes expatriation, the average length of individual service is shorter than in the case of our other native soldiers; the result being that a larger number of trained soldiers from Pathan squadrons and companies annually pass back to their homes than is the case with a proportionately large establishment of any other race. The loyalty and conduct of Pathan troops actually serving with the colours has usually been all that could be desired during frontier expeditions; but, on the other hand, it can hardly be expected that men who have become merged again into their tribe, and who, according to their own ideas, are no longer bound to us by any obligation, should maintain an attitude of complete aloofness from any tribal movement prompted by racial feeling and religious excitement. In the Tirah Expedition of 1897-98, the participation of pensioners and reservists in armed resistance to our troops had attained to such proportions, and was regarded as so serious a matter, that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab found it necessary to address the Government of India on the subject, pointing out how numerous these pensioners were, and suggesting drastic measures in regard to them.

Although the fighting powers of the Afridis, from the causes mentioned above, have increased to a very formidable extent, the increase in our own powers of dealing with them have increased in a still greater ratio. Greater efficiency and more perfect armament; the more complete and extensive organization of the services of transport and supply; the greater knowledge of the independent territory beyond our border, gained partly during expeditions and partly by the accumulation of intelligence at other times; the moral effect of the expeditions, uniformly successful, into the most inaccessible fastnesses of the tribe, bringing

home to them the fact of their complete helplessness when Government puts out its strength against them, are all factors which more than counterbalance any accession of strength which the last twenty years have given to the tribesmen. In addition we have to consider the immense advantages which the advance of railway construction in recent years has given to Government for the rapid and certain concentration of its resources at any given point.

Previous to the Afghan War of 1878-80, the point of railway nearest to the most formidable of the frontier tribes was Jhelum. The railway has since then been pushed on to Peshawar, and through Peshawar to Jamrud; a branch line runs for hundreds of miles along the left bank of the Indus; Kushalgarh is connected up, through Golra, with Rawalpindi; and from Kushalgarh West, on the right bank of the Indus, the line of light railway running through Kohat and Hangu to Thal, along the flank of the Orakzai and Afridi country, gives enormously extended powers of offensive action against Orakzais, Afridis, and Wazirs.

The approaching completion of the railway bridge at Kushalgarh, the conversion of the existing Kushalgarh-Kohat-Thal light railway to broad gauge, and its further extension to the head of the Kurram valley, will give still more perfect communication between the frontier and the heart of the Indian Empire. The comparatively few main lines existing twenty years ago have since been extended in every direction, and the network of railways now covering India cannot fail to be of the utmost value in facilitating the concentration of troops and stores in the event of military operations. There is no doubt that these facts are gradually becoming better known and appreciated by the tribesmen. The additional facilities given them for travel outside of their own country are more and more used by them; and numbers of Afridis and other Pathans extend their travels, not only all over British India, but across the seas to our colonies, more particularly to Australia. They are not wanting in natural shrewdness and intelligence; and such intercourse can hardly fail to increase their appreciation of the vast resources at the disposal of their powerful neighbour, and of the uselessness of an armed conflict with Government.

Of the moral attributes of the Afridis, it is quite impossible to say anything in praise. Mackeson, writing of them, says: "The Afridis are a most avaricious race, desperately fond of money. Their fidelity is measured by the length of the purse of the seducer,

Character and customs of the Afridis. and they transfer their obedience and support from one party to another of their own clansmen, according to the comparative liberality of the donation." Unlike Muhammadans in general, the Afridis are said to have but little regard for the sanctity of marriage rights, although in other respects strict observers of the precepts of the *Koran*; and such is their shameless and unnatural avarice, that frequent cases occur of a man in good circumstances in the first instance marrying a good-looking girl, but, as times get harder, exchanging her for one of fewer personal attractions and a bag of money. Their women appear at all times unveiled in public, and it is a custom among them to marry the widows of their deceased brothers.

Ruthless, cowardly robbery, and cold-blooded, treacherous murder, are to an Afridi the salt of life. Brought up from his earliest childhood amid scenes of appalling treachery and merciless revenge, nothing can ever change him: as he has lived—a shameless, cruel savage—so he dies. And it would seem that, notwithstanding their long intercourse with the British, and that very large numbers of them are, or have been, in our service, and must have learnt in some poor way what faith, and mercy, and justice are, yet the Afridi's character to-day is no better than it was in the days of his fathers.

Yet he is reputed brave by those who have seen him fighting. Hardy he is in his own hills, but he is very impatient of heat, and does not like work in the plains, but immediately longs for the cool breezes of Tirah. As soldiers of the British Government, they have gained a greater reputation for fidelity than in any other career. Much has been said of their fidelity in fighting against their own people for us; but when it is remembered that an Afridi generally has a blood-feud with nine out of ten of his own people, the beauty of this attachment fades. They have always been more noted in action for a readiness to plunder than fight, as was the case with Shah Sujah at the battle of Ispahan.

"On the whole," says Elphinstone (generally so eager to record anything good of Afghans), "they are the greatest robbers among the Afghans, and, I imagine, have no faith or sense of honour; for I never heard of anybody hiring an escort of Khaibaris to secure his passage through their country,—a step which always ensures a traveller's safety in the lands of any other tribe."

Notwithstanding this estimate, which MacGregor says some will consider harsh, the Afridi is, on the whole, one of the finest of the Pathan races on our border. His appearance, too, is much in his favour, and he is really braver, more open, and not more treacherous than many other Pathans. This much is certain, that he has the power of prejudicing Englishmen in his favour, and there are few brought into contact with him who do not at least begin with an enthusiastic admiration of his manliness. Again, with a tight hand over him, many of his faults remain dormant, and he soon develops into a valuable soldier.

Hospitality is said to be one of the virtues of an Afridi, and it is possible that if there was no chance of robbing, if not of murdering, a traveller before he came to his door, he would offer such cheer as was forthcoming; but the wanderer who breaks bread with an Afridi must be cautious; for his host, even while providing his best, will surely be concocting some devilry to entrap his guest as soon as he has left the confines of his lands, or even the shelter of his roof. Still, there are not wanting instances of their giving refuge to a fugitive, and laying down their lives in his defence.

The Afridis are very ignorant, and, although nominally under the rule of their *maliks*, have but very little respect for anything like authority. The men who have most influence amongst them are their *mullas* and *saiyids*. They are all of the Sunni persuasion of the Muhammadan faith.

The Afridis are seldom at feud with their neighbours, as a tribe against tribe, whatever may be the relations of individual members with those of neighbouring tribes. For some years past their extra-tribal feuds have been in a state of quiescence; but amongst themselves they are eternally at feud. Generally the quarrel is confined to the two sections between whom the dispute happens to be; but in cases where the general interests of the whole tribe are concerned, the clans range themselves in the two great factions of Samil

and Gar,¹—the Samil faction including the Malikdin Khel, Zakha Khel, Aka Khel, Sipah, and Kamrai clans; and the Gar, the Kambar Khel, and Kuki Khel. The Adam Khel belong to neither faction, but side with one or the other, as their interests may dictate.²

Though in themselves the most disunited of people, in the event of a threatened invasion of their country their *mullas* and *maliks* induce them to lay aside their petty animosities, and unite to face the common danger and defend their common faith. On such occasions it is usual to assemble a council composed of the heads of villages in each clan, and, through the medium of priests, to patch up their internal disputes. They manage this in rather a primitive manner; each negotiator takes a stone, and, placing it on the top of that of his clansman, swears a solemn vow, that, until the common cause be finally settled and these stones removed, the feud between the two parties shall be dormant; and their oaths on these occasions are seldom violated. These councils also arrange all the plans of the campaign and the number of men required from each branch of the tribe, which are furnished in quotas from villages in proportion to their numerical strength, and each party is headed by its own *malik*. On taking the field, each man brings with him a sheep-skin full of flour, and the amount of ammunition that he can manage to collect; but, should hostilities be protracted beyond the time that the supply of provisions will last, the clans are either kept together and fed by contributions from villages in the neighbourhood, or disperse for a few days to collect ammunition and to replenish their commissariat; but, should the latter contingency be adopted, it frequently happens that mistrust of each other, and the fear of treachery in their neighbours, prevent their again uniting.

When no external enemy is in the field, the different clans of this great tribe are continually warring amongst themselves, and it

¹ These are the political factions on the Peshawar and Kohat borders. They are said to be derived from two brothers named Gar and Samil, who many years ago had a quarrel, one brother being aided by one party of Pathans, the other by a separate party, whence arose a feud, and now not a year passes that some men are not killed on this old story. The Gar and Samil parties are confined to the

Kohat and Peshawar borders. This faction feeling has, however, not sufficient hold on the different sections of a tribe to make them side against their own tribe with outsiders, and with the Afridis the feeling has not so strong a hold as with some other tribes.

² The Adam Khel are now said to belong to the Gar Faction.

is no uncommon occurrence to find even one-half of a village carrying on a skirmish with the other half; and this may be carried on for two or three consecutive days, the parties firing from towers, or from behind rocks, or any other shelter, upon each other. After seven or eight casualties have occurred on either side, or all their ammunition is exhausted, the point at issue is generally settled by an interchange of marriages.

When not engaged in plundering, the Afridis do simply nothing; time hangs heavily on their hands; for all the common necessary duties of daily life are performed by their women, while the men sleep, or talk of the last midnight murder or robbery. All such domestic labours as fetching wood and water, and cooking, fall to the lot of women, as they do in more civilized countries; but to the Afridi women, in addition, falls nearly all the outdoor labour in the fields. The consequence is, that they are anything but womanly in appearance, habits, or manner; indeed, they are said to be deadly shots with stones, and to frequently distinguish themselves in the defence of their homes. But the Afridis round the Kohat pass are different. Their minds have become more open to the beauties and the results of industry. They are great traders, or rather carriers, and convey the salt from the mines in the Kohat district to Swat, Bajaur, and even Chitral. They also cut and sell the firewood of their hills to the British garrisons of Peshawar and Kohat. By these means they are relieved from the old necessity of robbing and procure a comfortable subsistence.

Between 3,000 and 4,000 Afridis are scattered over India in the military service of the British Government, and of native chiefs. All the clans are represented in these emigrants, except the Zukha Khel, who, according to report, do not leave their own hills.

The Afridis have nothing to give, save fuel, in exchange for our commodities, and so there is no trade properly so called; yet intercourse with us is necessary to them, as their own country does not produce sufficient to feed them, and consequently a strict blockade is a serious measure to most of the clans, especially the Adami Khels and Aka Khels.

Trade is much in the hands of Hindus, who hold a fairly comfortable and respectable position. But they are obliged to wear trousers vertically striped with red, to distinguish them from the

faithful, and, idolatry being sternly forbidden on pain of death, are of necessity all Sikhs. *Dharmshalas* with the *Granth* are permitted. Every Hindu is the *hamsaya* of some Afridi *naik* or patron, to whom he pays fines on the birth, death, or marriage of a member of his family. In return, the *naik* is bound to look after his *hamsaya*, and protect his interests. This is not merely a nominal charge, and an Afridi will not accept Hindu *hamsayas* without the consent of his family to the new responsibility undertaken. The Hindus state they immigrated many generations ago from the Punjab. They have adopted many of the wild habits and martial qualities of their Muhammadan lords, and are singularly careless of restrictions about food and drink.

With the insecurity of life and general lawlessness among the Afridis, it is curious to find that sales of land should be constantly effected, and deeds be drawn up which are afterwards produced as proof of the sale. Mortgages, too, are not uncommon, and are scrupulously respected. A quarrel (what we should call a civil suit) is settled by *jirga*, or, according to Muhammadan law, by the *mullas*; but if both fail, or the parties so prefer it, there is no other means of coming to a conclusion than by arms.

Blood-feuds arise on the slightest occasion, but are spasmodically pursued, often with great bitterness; at other times the feud is, by mutual consent, allowed to slumber for years, especially if the enemies are not near neighbours. But it is a point of pride and honour to go on as long as possible with the feud. Doubtless many an Afridi who has had violent ancestors, finds his life such a burden to him, and the constant anxiety and watchfulness entailed by a handful of blood-feuds so harassing, that he willingly escapes to the haven of India, and the comparative rest obtained by service in the army; hoping that time will, before he returns home, have buried many wrongs in oblivion. In addition to private feuds, it is common to have, simultaneously, tribal feuds, when perfectly innocent strangers who happen to belong to the implicated tribes are liable to be shot.

The great security of the Afridis lies in the strength of their country for defence. Their chief point of weakness lies in the facilities with which they can be shut up in their own hills, and cut off from communication with the outer world, provided adequate measures are adopted to effect such a purpose.

The Afridis derive their importance from their geographical position, which gives them command of the Khaibar and Kohat roads; and the history of the British connection with them has been almost entirely with reference to these two passes. Their history before the date of their connection with us can have no interest for any one. Whatever the dynasty has been—whether Jangez, Timur, Babar, Nadar, Ahmad Shah, the Sikh, or the *Farangi* has reigned—it has ever been a record of broken faith.

The Afridis in their mountains, which they inhabit for the most part in the summer, have movable huts made of mats. They come down to the low hills in the winter, where they chiefly live in caves cut out of the earthy part of the hills. They are migratory in their habits. In the autumn months they descend from the pasture grounds about Maidan and Upper Bara with their families and flocks, and pass the winter in the Khaibar, Bazar, Kajurai, and Lower Bara districts. In these several localities, each clan has its own apportioned limits, and in all they generally live in caves, which are formed in long galleries in the cliffs and sides of the ravines in all parts of the hills. None of the sections live in tents. They have a few villages formed by a collection of houses close together. As a rule, each family has its own separate dwelling, proportioned in size to the numbers of the household and their cattle and flocks. Generally, a family of brothers, with their respective children and blood relations, constitute the little communities of these separate dwellings, which are always fortified by walls and towers, and are located on commanding sites on the hills. Sometimes these little forts contain thirty or more separate houses within the enclosure. In April and May the Afridis again move up to their higher hills. A portion, however, of the Kuki Khels, Malikdin Khels, Sipahs, and nearly all the Adam Khels remain in their lower settlements throughout the year.

The area of the country inhabited by the Afridis is about nine hundred square miles. The principal streams that drain their hills are, the northern branch of the Bara river, or Bara proper, the Bazar or Chura river, and the Khaibar stream, all flowing into the Peshawar valley. The valleys lying near the sources of the Bara river are included in the general name of Tirah, which comprises an area of

600 to 700 square miles. The greater part of Tirah is inhabited by different sections of the Orakzai tribe, but the valleys known as Rajgal and Maidan are occupied by the Afridis.

The Rajgal valley is drained by one main stream, into which fall some lesser streams from the surrounding hills. Its length is about ten miles, and the breadth of the open country lying on either side of the central stream about four to five miles where widest, its elevation here being over 5,000 feet. Rajgal is inhabited by Kuki Khel Afridis, and their hamlets lie near the stream in the centre of the valley. Temporary sheds are erected by the shepherds among the pine forests which clothe the sides of the surrounding mountains. On the south, Rajgal is separated from Maidan by a steep, rocky, but well-wooded, spur, eight to nine thousand feet in elevation.

Maidan is a circular valley, or basin, about ten miles in diameter, surrounded by mountains, rising to about seven thousand feet in elevation. The northern slopes of these are covered with firs and holly oak, while the southern slopes are generally bare. The climate is described as excellent, the heat of summer being tempered by frequent thunder-storms. In winter the absence of wind makes the cold less severe; but snow lies for three months and more, and sometimes to great depth. The valley is well drained by three or four large watercourses; that to the west, where the Malikdin Khel hamlets stand, is known as the Shaloba, which name is also applied to the entire stream after the others have joined it, *viz.*, the Sher Darra, occupied by the Zakha Khels from the east; the Manakas, occupied by some families of the Jawaki and Ashu Khel sections of the Adam Khels; and the Kahu, occupied by the Kambar Khels. These converging, form the Shaloba Toi, which, leaving Maidan, enters a narrow, rocky gorge three miles long, commanded by heights rising 1,000 feet above it on either side. After emerging from this defile, the torrent flows through open country for two or three miles, then joins the Rajgal stream at Dwa Toi, after which the united stream receives the name of Bara. The open lands between the watercourses are covered with wheat and barley fields, and studded with numerous isolated dwellings which, though loopholed, were apparently not made for defensive purposes. The banks of the streams are honeycombed with caves. It is difficult to ascertain

how many Afridis stay during the winter in Maidan,—probably not more than one-fifth of its summer inhabitants. In a warm winter, or if troubles were apprehended towards Peshawar, no doubt more would remain.

After the junction of the Rajgal and Maidan drainage, the united stream, as already mentioned, receives the name of Bara, and the valley through which it flows down to its exit in the Peshawar valley is also known by this name. The elevation of this valley is from 5,000 feet at Dwa Toi to 2,000 at Kajurai; on the north side it is hemmed in by the Surghar range, which divides it from the Bazar valley. This range averages from 6,000 to 7,000 feet in elevation. Its crest and sides are steep and rocky, fairly well wooded with ilex and wild olive, but few timber trees; grass covers much of the slopes, and affords excellent grazing for the cattle during the winter months. Closing in the Bara valley to the south is a range rising to 8,500 feet near Maidan, but falling gradually as it runs east. This range is also very rough and rocky, but has a few timber forests above Waran and Maidan. The slopes of these ranges north and south of the Bara valley close inwards on the stream in the centre, sometimes leaving only a narrow, difficult defile between; at other places their bases are a mile or so on either side from the bank, leaving flat or terraced ground between. In these small basins lie the hamlets and the splendid rice-fields of the various clans who inhabit the valley. The heat in summer is excessive, fevers prevalent, and mosquitoes very troublesome; hence the hamlets are deserted during the hottest months, even by the families that do not resort to Tirah; these take their flocks and herds with them, and live in sheds on the mountain slopes and crests. The valley is portioned out between several clans. Starting from Dwa Toi, in succession come the Malikdin Khel, the Kamrai, the Kambar Khel, the Sipah, the Zakha Khel, the Aka Khel, and the Sturi Khel (Orakzais); then again at its exit into the Kajurai plain, the Malikdin Khel, the Kambar Khel, the Kamrai, and the Sipah clans. The principal villages in the valley are Barwan and Barkai, of the Sturi Khel Orakzais, and the numerous hamlets known as Torabela of the Zakha Khel Afridis.

Shortly after entering the Kajurai plain, the Bara river is joined by the Mastura, which runs south of the main branch and

parallel to it. To the north of the Mastura, and not far from Maidan, is the Waran valley. This valley, inhabited by the Aka Khel Afridis, is a basin about ten miles long and four or five miles broad, surrounded by mountains about 8,000 feet in elevation.

Kajurai, into which the united waters of the Bara river flow, is a basin of about thirty square miles in extent. The country is undulating and open, and is covered with long grass. This tract forms the winter resort of the Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Kamrai, and Sipah Afridis, who live in cave dwellings. There is a considerable village with several towers, on the left bank of the Bara river, about three miles from Fort Bara, called Ilamgudar. This village, famous for its rifle factory, is occupied all the year round by Sipah Afridis. There is generally a good supply of water in the Bara river; and in ordinary years the rush of water is so heavy during the melting of the snows above Rajgal and Maidan, that the low country near Peshawar on the banks of the river is flooded.

The summer and winter settlements of the Afridi clans (exclusive of the Adam Khel) are as follows :—

<i>Kuki Khel</i> Summer.—Rajgal valley. Winter.—Jamrud and neighbouring hills.
<i>Malikdin Khel</i>	Summer.—Maidan and Upper Bara. Winter.—Kajurai, Chura, and Khaibar.
<i>Kambar Khel</i>	.. Summer.—Maidan and Upper Bara. Winter.—Kajurai.
<i>Kamrai</i>	.. Summer.—Maidan and Upper Bara. Winter.—Kajurai.
<i>Zakha Khel</i>	.. Summer.—Maidan and Bara. Winter.—Khaibar and Bazar.
<i>Sipah</i> Summer.—Bara. Winter.—Lower Bara and Kajurai.
<i>Aka Khel</i>	.. Summer.—Waran and Bara. Winter.—Hills between Kajurai and Kohat pass.

During the summer months, the winter habitations of the Khaibar Afridis, including Bazar, are quite deserted, if one excepts a few Kuki Khel villages around Jamrud and the Malikdin Khel villages of Chora, which are inhabited all the year round. The Zakha Khels have a great hold over the other clans, not so

much from the extent of ground they occupy—for much of it in the Khaibar and Bazar is sterile—as from their position lying between the winter and summer homes of the other sections. They alone can move from Bazar and the Khaibar to Bara, and thence along the crest of the Torghar, without having to pass through the lands of any other clan; every other section, unless prepared and able to make a wide *détour*, is obliged semi-annually to take its families, cattle, and household goods through Zakha Khel territory in any circumstances, if not also through that of other clans. Naturally, in consequence, the other clans are very shy of incurring the resentment of the Zakha Khels, as a body, and, unless greatly exasperated, will endeavour to remain collectively on good terms with them. Thus, for instance, the Kuki Khels have occasionally been obliged to reach Rajgal from the Khaibar by going round Tartara, through Mohmand and Shinwari country. Other tribes have reached Maidan from Kajurai, *viâ* Orakzai and Aka Khel limits, when at enmity with the Zakha Khels. And for a clan of one tribe to migrate through tribes not connected with it, or its parent tribe, is a delicate experiment. So, upon the whole, by virtue of their position, the Zakha Khels enjoy pre-eminent consideration in Afridi councils. They are less amenable, too, to our control, as their winter settlements are a long way from the border, and their trade with British territory is small.

Next to the Zakha Khels, the Malikdin Khels and Kuki Khels possess the most compact settlements in the Chora and Khaibar valleys, parts of which, as mentioned above, are held summer and winter by portions of these tribes, at Chora itself, and near Jamrud.

The road through the Khaibar, as far as it passes through Afridi limits, is held by the six clans known as the Khaibar Afridis. The road is divided into six sections, which, commencing from Jamrud, are guarded as follows:—The first section is in the hands of the Kuki Khels, the second in charge of the Sipahs, the third is held by the Kuki Khels again, the fourth by the Kambar Khels and the Kamrai, the fifth by the Malikdin Khels, and the sixth by the Zakha Khels. The present arrangements with reference to the Khaibar will be referred to again further on.

Before proceeding to an account of the routes in Afridi country, it may not be out of place briefly to sketch the lines that are taken

by Afridi raiders in attacking the road through the Khaibar or the Peshawar district. When, for whatever reason, it is determined

Afridi raids.

that a raid is to be made, a few experienced old raiders, respected either for

their skill in planning forays, or for their large personal following, consult together and fix upon a plan, after hearing the reports of spies, who have returned from the threatened localities. Having made up their minds what to do, a summons is sent round to well-known raiders and other young men of their tribe, giving notice that a raid is appointed for a certain date, and all willing to join are to come, with so many days' supplies, to a rendezvous. These preliminaries are always held at as great a distance as possible from the point to be attacked, in order to prevent the news from leaking out ; and all particulars are kept a profound secret by the chief raiders. Thus, in summer, raids are concocted in Tirah ; in winter, in Upper Bara and Bazar ; and though the fact that a raid in some direction is contemplated becomes known, no one but the leaders can tell where the raid will strike till it has begun to move. Very often false reports are carefully spread to mislead informers. A sufficient number of armed raiders having collected at the rendezvous, the raid moves with the utmost rapidity on the objective, timing itself to arrive in its immediate vicinity during the night. The raiders having probably walked continuously thirty or forty miles, lie down for a few hours' rest, and spies are thrown out to give warning of counter-attacks, or of the approaching booty. At daybreak, or as soon as practicable after it, they swoop down on their prey ; whatever animals they can lay hands on are rapidly collected, the retreat begins, the cattle or beasts of burden are urged to their highest speed, and the band retires as swiftly as it came, walking or running for many miles, till beyond all danger of pursuit. If pursued, the lagging cattle are cut down, and a show of resistance is made ; if the pursuit is hot, the plunder is abandoned, for to lose lives is not the object of the raid. But should the raiders succeed in carrying off their booty, they halt on reaching a place of safety, and, if it is prudent to do so, divide their spoil, break up, and go home to recruit after their exertions. Occasionally, however, it is thought expedient to get rid of the loot at once, in which case the chief raiders arrange with friendly tribes to pass on the cattle

that have been robbed to distant valleys, where they are kept for a time, and then disposed of when matters have quieted down.

With regard to the roads in Afridi territory, there are two main routes from Peshawar to Maidan and Rajgal, one through the Khaibar and Bazar valleys, and the other up the Bara valley.

All routes and tracks leading from Jamrud, Ali Musjid, Landi Kotal, and Dakka to Bazar converge at China in Bazar, and have all been traversed at different times by our troops; they are, therefore, sufficiently well known. It is enough to say, taking the roads which constitute the lateral communications between the Khaibar and Bazar, that the road by Shudanna to Chora is fair, and that the passes from Ali Musjid and Shagni over the Chora Kandao and thence to China are the best, and are practicable for cavalry and laden camels. The road from Ali Musjid to Alachi and thence to Karamna is a mule track. From Garhi Lalabeg, the Bori pass, practicable for Afridi pack-bullocks and mules, gives access to Bazar; this is the usual route for the Zakha Khels of the Khaibar when going to Bazar. From Chora to Walai and China, in Bazar, elevation 4,200 feet, the main road follows the bed of the stream.

The route from China continues westward up the Bazar valley for six or eight miles more, and then crosses the Jarobi, or Mangol Bagh, pass, elevation over 5,500 feet, the ascent to and from which is said to be very easy and the road broad. It then descends into the Bara valley at the Sipah village of Sandana, on the bank of the river, in open country.

The main route from Sandana follows the course of the Bara river upwards, six or eight miles, through open, level country, to Dwa Toi, the junction of the Rajgal and Maidan streams, up the banks of which there are roads leading to the valleys of these names. In addition to the main road just mentioned, three or four difficult paths cross from Chora and Bazar over the Surghar range at the Inzari, and the Bokar, or Halwai, passes. These pathways are difficult, and seldom used except for raiding purposes.

The other route to Maidan from Peshawar, *via* the Bara valley, is fit for camels the whole way and is much used by the Afridis in their annual migrations from Tirah to their cave villages on the eastern slopes of the hills which form the western border of the Peshawar plain. As far as the Gandao pass this route is fit for

carts. Beyond the pass it follows the bed of the Bara river to Maidan, and a cart-road could be made along the right bank of the river without much difficulty. At present the march up stream is an arduous task, as the stream is swift and full of large stones, and has to be crossed and recrossed an innumerable number of times.

For troops approaching Maidan, the Bara route would afford more water and forage than that through the Khaibar and Bazar. What would be the approximate number of men they would probably meet it is difficult to say, as that depends not only on local Afridi politics and feelings, but also on the attitude of the neighbouring tribes, more especially the Orakzais.

From Kohat a route to Maidan branches off the Kohat-Kurram road at Muhammad Khwaja, which place is 36 miles from Kohat and $37\frac{1}{2}$ from Maidan. This route is fit for carts as far as Shina-wari, and from thence to Maidan a camel-road was constructed in 1897.

The seven clans of the Afridi tribe, which form the subject of the present chapter, will now be briefly described.

The Kuki Khels are an important and powerful clan. They keep rather aloof from the other Khaibar Afridis, and boast that they are capable of

The Kuki Khels.

holding their own, if necessary, against the rest of the Khaibar. This is, however, mere boasting : they could not count on help from any except the Sipahs, and it would be dangerous for the latter to give it. They are mortal foes with the Zakha Khels and also with the Mullagoris.¹ They bear a bad character, but are courageous and warlike, and have supplied many good recruits to the Native

¹ The origin of the Mullagoris is wrapped in obscurity and they are not acknowledged by any of the surrounding tribes. What-
ever their origin may be, the tribe is now widely scattered, for, in addition to those who dwell north of and between the Khaibar and the Kabul river, there are others who live about Sapri, in the Mohmand hills, in the Sisobi glen, on the western slopes of the Pandperi range, and along the banks of the Kunar river. With all the surrounding tribes, except the Afridis, they are on friendly terms, but with the latter they are at deadly feud. The Mullagoris, resorting to those north of the Khaibar, muster barely 500 fighting men and are but ill-equipped with fire-arms. They have, how-

ever, an excellent reputation for courage, and, being a small tribe, have the good sense to keep united, and as mountaineers excel every tribe of the Khaibar range. With these qualities, notwithstanding their inferior armament, they have been able, not only to hold their own against the Zakha Khel and Kuki Khel Afridis, but even to take the aggressive and to harry the Khusrigis of Bazar. As far as we are concerned, we have had but little trouble with the tribe ; and the only occasion on which it has been necessary to coerce them was in 1866 when, for a series of minor offences, they were blockaded until they paid a fine of Rs. 600.

Army. They number about 4,500 fighting men, and are extremely well armed, a large number of their rifles having been stolen from the troops at Peshawar. They trade largely with Peshawar in firewood, grass, etc., and are more dependent on British territory than other tribes, and are notorious for robbery and other offences.

The Malikdin Khels are the Khan Khel, or head clan, of the Khaibar Afridis. The clan has lost much of its former influence owing to a succession of bad *maliks*; and whereas all the Khaibar

Afridis, with the one exception of the
The Malikdin Khels. Kuki Khels, would probably gladly have

followed the lead of the Malikdin Khels in former days, the Zakha Khel and Kuki Khel now claim to be able to meet them single handed, even though they be backed by all the other Afridi clans.

Although this clan belongs to the Samil faction, whilst the Kambar Khels are Gar, still the fact that these two are descended from one ancestor, by name Mir Ahmad, seems to have induced them to keep up a somewhat close relationship. A combination between the Malikdin Khels and Kambar Khels, who, when united, are called Mir Ahmad Khels, is looked upon as most probable in the event of any large tribal disturbance. The friendship between these two clans is also strengthened by the fact that they live near each other, both in Maidan and in Kajurai, and can therefore combine easily to resist a common enemy.

The Malikdin Khels are well armed, and are also well versed in the use of arms, owing to large numbers of them having passed through the ranks of the regular native army. They are more civilised than the other Khaibar Afridis, and possess a large number of English and Kabul rifles. They number about 4,000 fighting men.

The Kambar Khels. The Kambar Khels belong to the Gar faction, like the Kuki Khels, but, notwithstanding this, there

is mortal enmity between these two clans. On the other hand, the Kambar Khels are proud of being descended from the same ancestor, Mir Ahmad, as the Malikdin Khels, and are disposed to join with them in tribal disputes, although the latter belong to the Samil faction.

They are well known for their warlike disposition. A considerable number take service in our army, and, owing to these

circumstances, they are generally well armed, and possess a large number of English rifles. Their fighting strength is about 4,500.

The Kambar Khels come into Peshawar and Kohat to trade during the winter, but they keep more apart from intercourse with British territory than any of the other Khaibar Afridis, except wild Nasrud-din Zakha Khels; and, owing to this, they are little dependent on the British Government.

The Kamrai or Kamar Khel, is the smallest of all the clans, their armed strength consisting of barely 600 men. The clan is a peaceable one, and interferes very little with the concerns of its neighbours; and, in fact, they would be altogether insignificant were it not for the circumstance that they hold possession of the Tsaok route between Bara and Maidan. Nearly all the Khaibar Afridis use this pass, which is defensible by a few men against great odds. The Kamrai, though ill-armed, are thus able to hold it easily, and consequently to seriously inconvenience any clan which may not be on friendly terms with them, and to whom free access is an object.

They trade a good deal with Peshawar, bringing in wood and grass during the winter. They would feel the loss of this trade severely in the event of a blockade, and this, combined with the fact that their winter settlements are within easy reach of the Peshawar garrison, makes them naturally anxious to keep on good terms with the British Government.

The Zakha Khels are the most important and most powerful clan of all the Khaibar Afridis. Their importance is chiefly due, as already explained, to their position. In politics they are Samil, but as clan against clan, they are on fairly good terms with all the other Afridis, except the Kuki Khel, with whom they are at deadly feud. They are the most turbulent of all the tribe, and number about 4,500 fighting men, most of whom are well armed; but their reputation for courage does not stand so high as that of some of the other clans. They cultivate as little as they possibly can, and despise the fuel and grass trade with Peshawar, and, in addition, levy tolls on their neighbours.

Most of the troubles that occur between us and the Afridis are caused by this clan.

The Sipahs though small in point of numbers—they only possess about 1,200 fighting men—have a very high reputation for bravery, and, being well armed, are able to give a good account of themselves. They are Samil in politics, and are friendly with the Malikdin Khel and Kamrai.

The Aka Khels are one of the most troublesome of the Afridi clans, and are perhaps the most discontented, owing to the fact that they have no voice in the Afridi *jirgas* in matters relating to the Khaibar and Kohat passes. They number about 1,800 fighting men, and are fairly well off, as they own some good land in the Bara and Waran valleys, and are rich in cattle.

The fighting strength of the Khaibar and Aka Khel Afridis is therefore as follows :—

Kuki Khel	4,500
Malikdin Khel	4,000
Kambar Khel	4,500
Kamrai	600
Zakha Khel	4,500
Sipah	1,200
Aka Khel	1,800
Total				21,100

This, added to the number of fighting men of the Adam Khel clan, estimated at 5,900, gives a total of 27,000 as the fighting strength of the Afridis, which is probably nearly correct.

Expedition against the Aka Khel Afridis by a force under Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Craigie, C.B., in March 1855.

British connection with the Afridis began in 1839, when Colonel Wade, with a contingent of Sikh troops, forced the Khaibar.

The first occasion, however, after the annexation of the Peshawar valley, in which we came into actual conflict with any of the Afridi clans which form the subject of the present chapter, was at the end of 1854.

In that year the Basi Khel section of the Aka Khels, not finding themselves admitted to a share in the allowances of the Kohat pass

commenced a series of annoyances and depredations on the Peshawar border, with a view of extorting from Government a participation in those allowances. Amongst other acts, they murdered a syce belonging to the force at Matanni, threatened that village, and finally filled up a well which was being dug at Aimal Chabutra.

On this, Major J. H. Craigie, O.B., commanding a detachment at Bazid Khel, went in pursuit. This party was fired at by the Basi Khels, but was too late to catch them in the plain. On the 9th of December 1854, a Khattak British subject was murdered near Akhor by them, in order to implicate the Adam Khels, with whom they were at feud, and it became necessary to institute a blockade of the clan.

At this time the camp of Lieutenant W. Hamilton, Bengal Artillery, Assistant Civil Engineer, together with his office and treasure chest, happened to be pitched near Badabir, about ten miles from the foot of the hills; and on the night of the 9th of February 1855, the Basi Khels descended on his camp to kill and rob. Lieutenant Hamilton fought bravely for his life, and escaped with some wounds, after shooting one of his assailants; but sixteen of his people were killed and thirty wounded, the Basi Khels carrying off some Rs. 10,000 of Government treasure and property, besides some private effects.

Soon after this, Captain H. R. James, Deputy Commissioner, who was out on the frontier, reported that those branches of the tribe whose winter settlements are between Jani-ka-Ghari, west of Fort Mackeson, and the Bara river, continued to bring their cattle into the grazing grounds at the foot of the hills, as they felt themselves secure from any sudden attack, in consequence of the broad and stony plain lying between them and the nearest point where troops were located, the crossing of which would give them ample notice of any attack. On this, Major L. P. D. Eld, 9th Native Infantry, commanding a detachment at Fort Bara, attempted to surprise the village of Alam Kili by marching across the plain at night, so as to arrive there at early dawn. The march was made in excellent order and perfect silence; the detachment arrived at a ravine, about a mile from the village, an hour before daybreak; but as it was entering broken ground, it became necessary to halt till daylight, and some scouts were sent on to reconnoitre. When these had advanced a short distance from the head of the

column, they suddenly found themselves confronted by a picquet of twenty men in a hollow.

Being surrounded, they were compelled to fire, and the picquet fled to the village, firing signals as they went. The detachment then advanced as soon as the light admitted, and found the Afridis had reached the hills, up which they rapidly retreated. To have pursued them further would have involved the troops in a day's skirmishing on the hills without the prospect of inflicting much injury upon the enemy, and it was therefore considered better to return to camp and await another opportunity.

On the 23rd of February there was a spirited little affair

14th Irregular Cavalry, ¹	70 men.	between a force, noted in the margin,
9th Native Infantry, ²	62 „	under Lieutenant E. Tyrwhitt, 14th
Mounted Rifles,	20 „	Irregular Cavalry, and the Basi Khels.

The cavalry patrol from Fort Mackeson, finding a body of Basi Khels in a ravine under the Akhor hills, pursued them, the Akhor people joining in the pursuit, and setting fire to the first Basi Khel village, when Lieutenant Tyrwhitt, coming up with the infantry, drove the enemy from the hills above. The enemy then came down to a small plateau, about three-quarters of a mile distant; on this, Lieutenant Tyrwhitt charged them with the cavalry, driving them up to the village of Zawa, when he had to retire, coming under the matchlock fire from the hills. The retirement, which was pressed by the enemy, was very steadily covered by the 9th Native Infantry, although the enemy were in considerable numbers.

The enemy lost some seven wounded. Our loss was—two sowars of the 14th Irregular Cavalry, one sepoy of the 9th Native Infantry, and one sowar of the levies, wounded. *

After Major Eld's operations, the cattle were not brought out of the hills for some days, but the Aka Khels gradually re-acquired confidence, and every day advanced further into the plain, putting out strong picquets at night. On the 26th of February the scouts brought in the intelligence that the flocks had come down to the grazing grounds near Sadat Garhi. Captain James thought, therefore, that by locating a party in one of the ravines in that neighbourhood he might be enabled to intercept them. He accordingly

¹ Mutinied at Jhansi in 1857. ² Mutinied at Aligarh in 1857.

arranged a plan for doing so with Major Eld, and, considering it better to carry out the design at once, Major Eld marched from Fort Bara at 3 A.M. with the rifle and light companies, 9th Native Infantry, and a troop of the 16th Irregular Cavalry.¹ The march was performed without the least noise, and the men were located before dawn in a ravine lined with tangled grass and brushwood, scouts being placed in the trees in the vicinity and other places. The detachment remained quiet in this situation for about six hours, and at 11 A.M. the Afridi cattle were seen emerging on to the plain, with a party of armed men in advance, who narrowly inspected the brushwood and broken ground about them, the cattle following at a distance. Had they continued in this way an hour longer, they would have placed the detachment between them and the hills, and a large number of cattle and men would have fallen into its hands. Unfortunately, however, some *doolie*-bearers, who had fallen to the rear, found themselves at day-break in the plain without a sign of the detachment, and, returning to camp, they set out again under the escort of a few sowars to join it. The Afridis soon observed them, and began to return with their cattle. Seeing this Major Eld determined to pursue them, and took the cavalry towards the hills for that purpose; the infantry also advanced at a rapid pace over the low hills in their front, and all were soon engaged with detached parties of the Afridis. The detachment succeeded in capturing 100 head of cattle, killing three of the Afridis, and wounding five. Major Eld then arranged for the retirement of the force; this was effected in excellent order, the skirmishers holding the Afridis, who had gathered to the number of upwards of 300, in check. The detachment returned to camp at 4-30 P.M., with a loss of only one man wounded.

After this raid the cattle of the Aka Khels were taken further south, to the village of Mandan, which appeared to offer a perfectly safe retreat, as it is situated close to the Basi Khel villages, is strongly placed between two hills, and is approached only by a stony road, passing over much broken ground and several ravines with eminences, upon which their picquets were placed to guard against surprise. For some days the cattle went into the ravines

¹ Now the 7th Hariana Lancers.

to graze, but on the 5th of March Captain H. R. James arranged with Major L. P. D. Eld to attempt another surprise.

Accordingly, at 11 P.M., that officer moved out of camp with 300 men of the 9th Native Infantry and a troop of the 16th Irregular Cavalry; the party was conducted by Captain James in the direction of Matanni, and up a ravine which leads to the Basi Khel villages. At about a mile from Mandan a good place for concealment was found, where the detachment remained till the break of day. Scouts were placed on all the commanding points, and the approach of the cattle awaited; at about 11 A.M., strong guards came out of the village, and carefully examined every bush and ravine in their front, picquets were placed on various hills upon which low breastworks had been erected, and a party even came down a portion of the ravine in which the detachment was concealed. It was evident that they only anticipated attack from the direction of the camp, and they did not suspect that by making a circuitous march the detachment could get in rear of them.

The above precautions having been taken by the Afridis, their cattle emerged from the village, and were soon grazing on the low hills in front of it. It was not deemed advisable to wait much longer, for the neighing of a horse might now have discovered the detachment, which was not in a position to receive a large party in case of attack. It therefore moved a little further up the ravine, and then, gaining the high ground, advanced rapidly towards the village, thus intercepting the party that had gone out with the cattle.

Major Eld obtained a commanding position in front of the village, and parties were sent to collect the cattle, the whole of which was soon on the road to camp. The Afridis were taken so much by surprise, that they fled precipitately until they gained the hills in the vicinity of the village, where they rallied, and, their numbers increasing with incredible speed, they attempted to cut off some of the parties returning with the cattle. A company was detached to cover the latter, and, when the animals had been all secured, the detachments were called in, the cavalry sent to the rear, and the retirement covered by the riflemen of the 9th Native Infantry. All was effected in perfect order; but the Afridis pressed the detachment warmly for about three miles, till it had cleared the broken ground.

On this occasion Major Eld secured 1,000 animals, including bullocks, cows, donkeys, sheep, and milch-goats. Three of the Aka Khels were killed, one of whom, Gul Khan, was a man of much influence and wealth, and three others were wounded. The loss sustained by the detachment was very trifling—one sepoy slightly wounded and one horse killed.

After this, those sections of the clan against which these efforts had been directed evinced their submission in a mode most humiliating to Pathans, by sending in a deputation of their chief women to sue for peace on any terms. Captain James informed them that he would allow the elders of their portion of the clan to come to him and state their willingness or otherwise to conform to what might be dictated to them, including of course the restitution of the property plundered at Badabir, and the furtherance of the punishment of the remaining portion of the clan.

On the 25th of March 1855, intelligence having reached Captain James that the Aka Khels had returned with their cattle to the villages of Alam Kili and Mir Kili for the purpose of grazing, he suggested to Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Craigie, C.B., who had succeeded to the command of the troops, the expediency of driving them out of those places, and compelling them to give up the idea of resettling in the low hills without permission.

Accordingly, at midnight on the 26th of March, Lieut.-Colonel Craigie moved off from his camp at Mashu Khel, with the force marginally noted.

Peshawar Mountain Train
Battery.
Two troops, 16th Irregular
Cavalry.
Detachment, 4th Native
Infantry.¹
9th Native Infantry.
20th Native Infantry.²

To engage the Basi Khels, and to prevent their coming to the assistance of the other sections of the Aka Khels,

a force of 500 infantry were to move from Fort Mackeson at 2 A.M., towards the village of Zawa, whilst the Akhor men were to act on the left of this detachment above Akhor.

On arriving, at half-past 6 A.M., on the crest of a ridge of hills overlooking those occupied by the enemy, Lieut.-Colonel Craigie, who was accompanied by Captain H. R. James, the Deputy Commissioner, detached 300 men of the 4th Native Infantry, under the command of Major C. Patterson, to the village of Alam Kili, with

¹ Disbanded in 1861.

² Mutinied at Meerut in 1857.

instructions to destroy it, and then rejoin; which was successfully, accomplished.

A party of similar strength from the 20th Native Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant A. I. Shuldhham, followed after a short interval by the main column, was directed on Mir Kili, a village on the Bara river, the occupants of which fled on the approach of the troops, when the village was destroyed, as also a number of wood stacks.

The main column then proceeded towards the hills, on which the enemy had posted themselves, covered by the rifle and light companies of the 9th and 20th Regiments, under the command of Major L. P. D. Eld.

The hills over which the troops had to advance were steep, and afforded complete cover to the enemy, whose numbers amounted to 1,000 men. Lieut.-Colonel Craigie was obliged to throw out additional skirmishers, both to the front and flanks, so much so that two-thirds of the infantry were thus employed. The force then advanced about a mile and a half, driving back the enemy from hill to hill,—the sepoys behaving most gallantly; and as, in their eagerness to close with the enemy, they neglected to take full advantage of the cover afforded by the nature of the ground, they suffered more loss than they would otherwise have done.

At 8 A.M., seeing that the country in front was apparently much stronger than that over which the troops had passed, Lieut.-Colonel Craigie decided upon retiring. The crest of the hills in the rear was accordingly occupied successively by skirmishers, and the mountain guns sent back to take up a position on the range of hills from which the column had in the first instance descended.

The main body then began slowly to retire; on which the enemy returned in large numbers, and were enabled, from their knowledge of the ground, to press on the troops. their matchlock fire continuing to be heavy until the troops neared, at half-past 10 A.M., the ridge of hills where the mountain guns were in position.

The return march towards camp was begun at 11 A.M., skirmishers having been previously thrown out to the rear and right flank of the column, until the ground became suitable for cavalry. when the 16th Irregular Cavalry, under Lieutenant F. H. Smith, formed the rear-guard.

Our losses in this affair were nine killed and twenty-one wounded.

The principal object of the expedition had thus been fully attained; the Aka Khels had been driven out of an apparently secure retreat, which they could never re-occupy so long as they were under blockade, and which would cause them great distress.

The Indian Medal, with a clasp for the "North West Frontier," was granted in 1869 to all survivors of the troops engaged in the above operations.

After this the clan was forced to seek a temporary settlement amongst the Sipahs at a spot higher up the river, where there was but little pasturage for their cattle, and they were therefore soon forced to return to Waran.

Throughout the ensuing hot weather but little went on, the Aka Khels being in their summer settlements. On the return of the cold season they came down again to the plains; but the Commissioner, Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Edwards, C.B., obtained orders to keep up the blockade till the clan surrendered at discretion.

The blockade was accordingly resumed, and not a man of the Aka Khel clan could venture into the Peshawar market; their wood trade fell into the hands of other clans; and unusually large demands for wood for the public works raised the price of that article to an unprecedented height. About December the loss of annual profits began to be intolerable, and the Aka Khel *jirga* took into their serious consideration the question whether it would be better to make another burst of devilry upon the frontier, in hopes of being bought off, or to give in, and accept any terms that might be imposed. In consequence, all the police posts were strengthened and put on the alert while this point was under debate. Deputations from the Aka Khels went about from hill to hill beseeching the co-operation of the neighbouring clans in one more campaign, but their neighbours had got the wood trade, and declined. All this time the flocks and herds of the Aka Khels could not be grazed upon the open plain for fear of being surprised by the police, and another hungry winter was setting in. The case being hopeless, in the middle of December the Aka Khels sent in to make overtures of submission.

But, looking back to the origin of these annoyances, the Commissioner now determined to transfer the charge of the Aka Khel relation to Kohat, so that one Deputy Commissioner should not be played off against another. The Aka Khel *jirga* were therefore referred to Captain B. Henderson, commanding the 3rd Punjab Infantry, and Assistant Commissioner at Kohat, to whom instructions were sent to accept their overtures of peace on the following conditions :—

1st.—A fine of Rs. 2,500.

2nd.—Forfeiture of all blackmail for the future. (The Basi Khels received Rs. 600 from the Kohat pass allowances.)

3rd.—Refund to Government of all rewards paid for capturing members of the clan

After the usual number of deputations, and excuses, and evasions, the terms dictated by Captain Henderson at Kohat were agreed to by the clan.

Still, Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes refused to take off the blockade until the payment of the fine. The clan urged that, if allowed to bring their wood to the market at Peshawar, they would realize the amount immediately; but that officer replied that justice required the fine to be paid before the slightest kindness was shown to them.

They then proposed to pay in wood, and, as the Executive Engineer required all he could get, it was settled that they might deliver wood to the amount of the fine at two outposts—one being Badabir, the scene of the outrage.

The Aka Khels estimated their losses during the blockade at Rs. 77,120.

An agreement was then entered into with the Aka Khels by which they bound themselves, in addition to paying the above fine, to abstain from raids; not to harbour refugees and criminals; in disputes with British subjects to refer the matter to our tribunals, etc.

Thus, said Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes, ended the struggle of the Aka Khel Afridis with a settled Government. Instead of haughtily exacting blackmail from the British for the safety of the Kohat road, they paid a judicial fine for a highway robbery.

The reasons of the Basi Khels having been originally admitted to a share in the Kohat pass allowances will be given in Chapter III, when describing the arrangements with regard to that pass; but it may be here briefly stated that it was in consequence of their claiming a portion of land called Kalamsada, extending from Kotkai to Aimal Chabutra, at the mouth of the pass. Our subsequent dealings with the Basi Khels with regard to this piece of land will also be given in Chapter III.

Our next dealings of importance with the Afridis forming the subject of the present chapter, was with the Kuki Khel clan. In January 1857, when the Amir Dost Muhammad was encamped at Jamrud after his interview with Sir John Lawrence, whose camp was a few miles nearer Peshawar, a party of young officers rode beyond the Amir's camp towards the Khaibar pass, and were fired on by the Kuki Khels. One of the number, Lieutenant T. M. Hand, was so severely wounded that he died during the night. The crime having been brought home to the clan, they were blockaded, and many of their members fell into our hands. During these hostilities the Mutiny broke out, but the blockade was continued in full force, and was so injurious to the interests of the clan, that they paid down a fine of Rs. 3,000, and entered into the following agreement, *viz.*, not to harbour criminals; to resort to our courts in regard to quarrels with British subjects; and to send, when required, an agent to the Deputy Commissioner.

On the outbreak of the Mutiny the Zakha Khel clan was also under blockade for innumerable highway robberies, but, strange to say, they did not take advantage of the opportunity afforded them of troubling us, and on the 14th of August they made their submission, and entered into an agreement similar to that made by the Kuki Khels.

In the early part of 1861 a party of Zakha Khels made a raid on British territory in the neighbourhood of Kajurai. This tract of country is occupied, as already stated, during the winter months by the Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Kamrai, and Sipah clans, and these clans had for a long time refused, on various pretexts, to become jointly responsible for this part of the border.

On the occurrence, however, of this raid, in which one man was killed and three wounded, some of the Kajurai men were seized, and further proceedings threatened unless immediate reparation

was made, and an agreement entered into of joint responsibility for the future. The clans concerned sent their representatives to Peshawar, paid a fine of Rs. 1,000, and entered into the desired agreement, which closed that corner of the district against Zakha Khel and other robbers. The agreement with the Sipah and Kamrai clans was made on the 24th of April 1861; that with the Malikdin Khel and Kambar Khel shortly afterwards, and was of the same tenor, *viz.*—

We agree on our own parts, and in behalf of our respective clans, of our own free will and accord, as follows:—

- (I) During the six months of the cold weather, when we reside in the lands called Kajurai, we will be responsible that no theft or crime is committed on any British subject by any member of our clans, or by any member of the Zakha Khel or other clans passing through the said lands of Kajurai.
- (II) So long as the Zakha Khels may remain at feud with the Government, we will not allow members of that clan to take up their residence in the Kajurai settlements.

The clans concerned acted fairly up to the engagements entered upon, but it was found necessary to enforce their responsibility by making reprisals on them in 1874, when they allowed some Zakha Khel robbers a passage through their lands. Accordingly, 113 persons and 360 head of cattle were seized, the latter being restored when the Kajurai clans paid the small fine which had been imposed upon them.

The Zakha Khel, and also the Kuki Khel clan, continued to give trouble on our border, and maintained their reputation as the most inveterate and audacious robbers, whose depredations up to the very walls of Peshawar, and even within the city and cantonments, have been notorious since the days of the Sikh rule. On the night of the 4th December 1874, the bandmaster of the 72nd Highlanders, stationed at Peshawar, was carried off by a party of raiders belonging to the Zakha Khel clan, and taken to the Khoibar pass, when he was released uninjured, after a short detention, through the instrumentality of Arbab Abdul Majid Khan. Subsequently the representatives of the clan repudiated the acts of the robbers, and in token thereof burnt the house of the leader of the gang, and returned the small amount of property

taken from the bandmaster. At the beginning of 1875 attempts were made, with some success, to conciliate the Zakha Khels by inducing them to send in representatives to Peshawar. In January 1877 the Khalil *arbab*,¹ Abdul Majid Khan, who, under the direction of the Deputy Commissioner, had held the management of the Khaibar Afridis for many years past, died, and was succeeded in his duties by his son, Fateh Muhammad Khan, who, however, did not carry them on for long. Since 1878 our dealings with the Khaibar Afridis have been carried on direct with the tribes, through the officer in charge of the Khaibar. During the Jawaki complications, to be described in Chapter III, the Zakha Khels sent a contingent of 400 men to their help, but these did not go further than the Kohat pass, when they turned back. None of the other Afridi clans responded to the appeal of the Jawakis for help.

Expedition against the Zakha Khel Afridis of the Bazar valley,
December 1878.

From the time that the British army advanced into Afghanistan, on the 21st of November 1878, the Afridis of the Khaibar pass began to give trouble. On the 28th of November a signalling party, consisting of a few men under Major H. P. Pearson, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, on the Shagai hill, overlooking the Khaibar, was attacked by Afridis. Major Pearson's horse and grasseutter, with one man of the 81st Regiment, were killed, while another man of the same regiment and five mules were wounded.

In order to punish the perpetrators of this outrage, who were traced to the village of Kadam, two guns, supported by detachments of the 9th Foot and 45th Sikhs, accompanied the Political Officer, on the 1st December, to assist the *maliks* of the Kuki Khel clan in attacking the village of Kadam. Some of the marauders gave in at once, while others opened fire on the *jirga*. The supporting party on the heights above the village sent a shell amongst these, which dispersed them at once. The *jirga* then fired the towers and houses of the parties opposed to them. The punishment inflicted was purely a tribal affair, as our troops acted only as a support to the headmen.

¹ The *Khalils* are a tribe who inhabit a portion of the Peshawar district between the Khaibar hills and Peshawar. Their chiefs are styled *arbabs*.

had not consequently reached further at four o'clock on the morning of the 20th than within half a mile of Chora.

Captain L. H. E. Tucker, the Political Officer with the column, then reported that he had been misinformed as to the distance to Chora. Bazar was still at least eight miles further on, and the road to it lay through the bed of the Chora stream, which had to be forded constantly, about knee-deep, by the infantry.

There was consequently no longer any hope of surprising the enemy at daybreak. As the troops from Jamrud had already been under arms since nine o'clock on the morning of the previous day, and as no advantage was to be gained by advancing any further until daylight broke, a halt was ordered until daybreak at the place where the column had arrived, so that the men might get something to eat. The column then moved on, passing the village of Chora, inhabited by the friendly Malikdin Khels, up the bed of the river.

After passing Chora, the heights on both sides of the river were crowned by flanking parties of the 2nd Gurkhas. Lieut.-Colonel M. H. Heathcote, with a troop of the 13th Bengal Lancers, was sent forward to reconnoitre, and reported that there were no signs of an enemy.

The column moved forward without opposition, except a few long shots fired from the surrounding hills, and reached Walai, the first village of Bazar, soon after noon, but found it deserted.

The first object now was to open communication with the Dakka column, and a letter was accordingly forwarded to Brig.-General J. A. Tytler, and a reply to it received before the evening, stating that though the road he had advanced by had proved very difficult, he had reached the Sisobi pass, and would effect his junction with Lieut.-General Maude on the following day. The troops of the Jamrud column bivouacked for the night at Walai.

Captain Tucker having offered certain terms to the Zakha Khels of the Bazar valley, to be complied with by nine o'clock on the following morning, it was arranged that, in the event of these not having been accepted by the time fixed, the troops should move forward to destroy their towers and villages.

The terms offered were:—

- 1st.—The payment of a fine of Rs. 1,000.
- 2nd.—The surrender of six hostages, to be named by the Political Officer.
- 3rd.—The acceptance of Khawas, the chief of the friendly sections of the Zakha Khel, as the chief of the whole clan.

Meanwhile, the column under Brigadier-General Tytler marched from Dakka at 12-30 A.M., on the 19th, with two days' rations, and bivouacked in a grassy plain about eight miles distant from that place, resuming its march at five o'clock on the morning of the 20th of December. By sunrise the column had reached the village of Chenar.¹ The headman came out to make his submission, and he and another villager accompanied the troops as guides.

From Chenar the road runs in a south-easterly direction to the Sisobi villages,² against which the Dakka column had been directed to operate. After a march of three or four miles along a valley of moderate breadth, the villages became visible over the slightly rising ground on the right.

As soon the Brigadier-General had reconnoitred this position, he lined the heights on either side of the villages, and then sent on the Chenar guides to bring in the headmen. They shortly returned with the *maliks* of all the five villages, who tendered their submission and made offers of assistance to the troops. They were accordingly promised protection from damage, and the two most intelligent of the headmen were directed to attend the column as guides on its further advance.

The march was resumed about 12-30 A.M., in a south-easterly direction, through a well-cultivated valley, which here began to be wooded. After moving for a mile and a half through this valley, the column turned to the right, up a zig-zag path, where it could advance in single file only, to the top of the Sisobi pass. This ascent was estimated at 1,200 feet up a hillside covered with oak forest.

¹ This is a Shinwari village which had recently received punishment at our hands. A party of assassins, under the escort of some men of the Guide Cavalry, had been surprised on the 5th of December by marauders, who were subsequently traced to this village, and had lost three men and one horse of the escort killed, and one man

and one horse wounded. In consequence of this outrage, the fort of Chenar had been destroyed on the 10th of December by a small force from Dakka, under the command of Brigadier-General J. A. Tytler, V.C., C.B.

² These are inhabited by Mullagoris.

Continuing in a south-easterly direction, the march was directed towards the largest tower at the foot of the opposite hills, about four miles distant. This place was reached at four o'clock in the afternoon, and was found to consist of a large cave village of about sixty dwellings, which was entirely deserted. Here the column was halted for the night, and here the communication from Lieut.-General Maude, above alluded to, reached Brigadier-General Tytler, as the camp of the Jamrud column was only about three miles to the east.

The troops of the Jamrud column paraded at nine o'clock on the morning of the 21st of December, when the Political Officer reported that the terms offered had not been complied with. At the same hour, Brigadier-General Tytler, having ridden over from his bivouac, reported himself in person to Lieut.-General Maude. His opportune appearance at that particular time excited in no small degree the admiration of the friendly chiefs. He received instructions to destroy the village of Nikai, four or five miles to the westward of his bivouac, and any towers near his position. After destroying Nikai, Brigadier-General Tytler was directed to return to Dakka.

Shortly afterwards, the Jamrud column, having detached a guard for the camp, marched for the village of China. A troop of the 13th Bengal Lancers, under Major W. H. Macnaghten, was sent forward by a different route to the village of Halwai, with orders to destroy that village and to cut off any of the enemy who might be driven out of China.

When the column arrived at China it was found to be deserted; the 2nd Gurkhas therefore, under Lieut.-Colonel D. Macintyre, v.c., were detached to the south of the valley, while a detachment of the Mhairwara Battalion, under Captain O'M. Creagh, was ordered to the east of China. In this manner, every village in the valley of any importance was visited and its towers destroyed. The troops then returned to Walai.

The enemy had everywhere escaped with all his cattle and moveable property, which was not altogether to be regretted, as the destruction of the towers and the capture of a large quantity of grain sufficiently punished them, as well as adequately marked their inability to cope with our troops.

On the 22nd the Jamrud column returned to Ali Musjid. On the return march, the inhabitants of the small Zakha Khel village of Barar Kats succeeded in carrying off several mules. To punish this robbery a company of the 5th Foot and one of the 2nd Gurkhas were detached to burn their tower. While doing this, a small party of Zakha Khels was observed in a narrow gorge near the road. They were very soon dislodged, and two or three of their number killed.

In the meanwhile, the Dakka column, after destroying three villages and two of the towers in the vicinity of their bivouac, marched at 11 A.M. on the 21st for Nikai. This village was also burnt, after which it was too late to reach the Sisobi pass before nightfall, and there was no water nearer than the Sisobi villages. Learning, however, that there was water and a camping-ground some few miles off in another pass, called the Tibai pass, the General resolved to halt the force there for the night, and to move on to Dakka the next day by this new route. The road followed by the column shortly entered a wooded valley with a gradual ascent for about four miles. At half-past four o'clock in the afternoon the column reached the camping-ground, which consisted of several grassy plots in wooded ground.

The ground was commanded on all sides by hills, which were at once occupied by outlying picquets. It soon became evident that the enemy were assembling round the camp. The head of the column had scarcely reached the camping-ground when it was reported that the rear-guard had been attacked; several shots were fired into it close to the camping-ground, and one man of the 17th Foot was shot.

The force having all arrived, strong picquets were posted, and owing to the careful disposition of these numerous posts, the troops were undisturbed during the night. There was little doubt, however, that the enemy were gathering to molest the retirement of the column.

The top of the pass was about a mile distant, and from there one road diverged to the left to Pesh Bolak, while the other turned to the right to Dakka. The road up to the pass was overhung on the left by a high, precipitous mountain, inaccessible on that side, while to the right it was commanded by a series of low hills.

The guides stated that there was little risk of attack from the left, but that the right should be carefully guarded.

The Afridis notoriously attack the baggage guard in preference to any other part of a force, and it was therefore determined to change the usual order of march. Orders were consequently issued for each corps to take its own baggage with it. The artillery and sappers, being most encumbered with mules, were to follow close to the advanced guard. A very strong rear-guard was to be left behind, which, being quite unencumbered with the charge of baggage, would be able to resist the pressure from the rear.

Shortly after daybreak on the morning of the 22nd, a detachment of the 45th Sikhs, under Lieutenant H. N. M'Rae, was ordered to occupy the heights to the right of the pass in advance, and to join the rear-guard as it passed.

Two companies of the 27th Punjab Native Infantry, under Captain J. Cook, were sent to the top of the pass to examine and secure the road leading in from the left, and to check any enemy who might hold the high hill on that side.

These dispositions had not been completed when two signal shots were fired from above the water gorge to the right of the position. A company of the 17th Foot was at once despatched up the gorge, with orders to drive back any enemy it met with, and to rejoin the column further on, under the protection of the flanking parties. The column commenced its march at half-past eight o'clock in the morning. The road was winding, steep, and very difficult for mules, the ascent being about 1,000 feet, and the distance to the top of the pass about a mile and a quarter. The troops had scarcely begun to move when a lively but ineffective fusilade was opened from the high hill on the left.

As the column neared the top of the pass, the positions of the enemy became more exposed, and the flanking parties on the right fired across the valley, but, owing to the great range, with little effect. At the same time the two companies of the 27th Punjab Native Infantry had gone some distance along the road to the left, to examine and secure it. Seeing the Afridis on the top of the steep hill becoming troublesome, Captain J. Cook directed Lieutenant H. P. Leach, R.E., with his half company of sappers, who had just reached the crest of the pass, along with a party of the 27th Punjab Native Infantry under Lieutenant G. A. Williams, to capture the

summit. The position was gallantly carried, with the loss of one man wounded. This hill was then occupied and held by a detachment of the 27th Punjab Native Infantry, until the whole force had passed. Meanwhile, the advanced guard, guns, and the different corps, each as compact as possible, with the baggage animals in the centre, had pushed down the pass at a steady pace.

Before ten o'clock the rear-guard, consisting of one company of the 17th Foot and of the 27th Punjab Native Infantry respectively, under the command of Captain W. Lonsdale, of the former regiment, had become hotly engaged, and was reinforced by a second company of the 17th, which had now descended from the hill. Even then it had much trouble in keeping back the enemy, owing to the dense forest and consequent difficulty in seeing them. It was 11 A.M. before the rear-guard reached the summit of the pass. Captain Lonsdale was then directed to hold the crest of the pass with one company of the 17th Foot, and two companies of the 27th Punjab Native Infantry, until the flanking parties were withdrawn, when the rear-guard was to follow the column. The hills on the flanks had been occupied by parties of the 45th Sikhs; but notwithstanding this, the main body had been more or less molested in several places.

About three miles below the top of the pass the road passed through a narrow defile about five or six feet broad, with high, perpendicular walls of rock on either side. The water of the stream was there frozen into thick masses of ice, over which it was found difficult for the mules to travel. The entrance, as well as the outlet of this defile, was commanded from the heights by the flanking parties of the 45th Sikhs; nevertheless, a deep and narrow gorge from the right enabled a party of the enemy, estimated at about 100 men, to creep down unperceived, and to occupy a sheltered position about 200 yards from the outlet. As the 17th Foot and the 27th Punjab Native Infantry successively emerged in some confusion, they were met by a heavy fire from the enemy. Half a company of the 17th Foot moved up the hill and dislodged the tribesmen; but so dangerous did the place appear, that the Brigadier-General left his Orderly Officer, Captain G. W. Rogers, 4th Gurkhas, with a detachment of thirty men of the 45th Sikhs, to hold this position until the rear-guard should have passed,

The enemy, as had been anticipated, returned, but were kept in check by the fire of this party.

About four miles from the top of the pass the valley opens out into a plain with cultivated land, owned by the then friendly Shinwaris¹. Here the column halted for the rear-guard, which shortly afterwards joined it. It had been a continuous skirmish with the enemy from the top of the pass to the mouth of the gorge, where the party, under Captain Rogers, had been posted. The enemy seized the positions of the rear-guard and of the flanking parties as soon as they were abandoned; but when the cultivated ground was reached, all opposition ceased.

The troops were now mustered, and it was found that no man and no property whatever were missing, while the casualties only amounted to one man killed and seven wounded. The column then resumed its march, and Dakka was reached by the advanced guard shortly after 9 P.M.; but a difficult pass about three miles from that place so lengthened out the column, that it was half-past eleven before the whole force arrived in camp. The distance traversed in this day's march was estimated at twenty-two miles.

The number and losses of the enemy could not be estimated, but several of the Afridis were seen to fall. The total British casualties in the Dakka column during the expedition, amounted to two killed and twenty wounded.

Second Expedition against the Zakha Khel Afridis of the Bazar valley, January 1879.

After the expedition into the Bazar valley in December 1878, the Afridis of the Khaibar pass continued to give trouble.

Efforts were then made by the Political Officers to break up the tribal combination of the Afridis, and on the 8th of January it was reported that the pass was perfectly quiet. The Kuki Khels and the Kambar Khels came in and tendered their submission, but the attitude of the Zakha Khels continued to be unsatisfactory; and the Political Officer, Major P. L. N. Cavagnari, O.S.I., reported that he thought a good effect would be produced by a temporary occupation of the Bazar valley, and by deliberately visiting in rotation recusant villages in the Bazar and Bara

¹See footnote, page 51.

districts. He further considered that any measures adopted for the punishment of the refractory sections would not be calculated to interfere with the political arrangements entered into with the Khaibar clans. In consequence of these opinions, Lieut.-General Maude, commanding the 2nd Division, Peshawar Valley Field Force, applied on the 16th of January for the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief in India to the proposed expedition, in co-operation with a force from the 1st Division.

The plan of operation proposed by General Maude was to send a column from Jamrud by the direct road to the Bazar valley, and a second column, also from the 2nd Division, from Ali Musjid, by the Alachai route to the same destination. When these two columns had effected a junction, they were to proceed to join the column of the 1st Division from Basawal, at the head of the Bazar valley. The three columns having united, were to be employed for three days in scouring the Bazar valley from this central position, but no opposition was expected during this part of the operations. Enough information had not been obtained to mature a plan of operations in Bara, but General Maude, who was to take the command himself of the whole force, anticipated that the troops which would then be under his orders would suffice to carry out successfully any operations decided on in that direction.

The expedition was sanctioned, but owing to a misapprehension of the proposed plan of operations, its duration was limited to ten days. This time was insufficient to carry out General Maude's original proposals, as he had contemplated a concentration of the whole force in the Bazar valley on the fifth day, and no advance to Bara till at least the ninth day; but the Lieut.-General considered that it would be out of place for him to question the decision of Government, and he therefore issued the necessary orders for the march of the different columns.

Jamrud Column.

	<i>All ranks.</i>
D.A. Royal Horse Artillery, (2 guns on elephants) ..	28
11 th Royal Artillery (2 guns) ..	22
5th Fusiliers ..	313
25th Foot ..	316
17th Bengal Cavalry ..	145
Medres Sappers and Miners ..	55
24th Punjab Native Infantry ..	356

The Jamrud Column, consisting of the troops detailed in the margin, marched from Jamrud on the 24th January, and, taking the road by the Khaibar stream, passed the Kuki Khel villages of Kadam, Gagrai, and Jabagai.

This column halted for the night in the bed of the river below Shudanna. As orders had been previously given by the Political Officer accompanying the troops, (Captain L. H. E. Tucker) that no armed men were to appear, none were seen, and the attitude of this section of the Afridis was perfectly peaceful.

The following morning this column continued its march by Taoda Mela and the Chora Kandao to Barar Kats, arriving there without opposition at four o'clock on the same afternoon. That part of the baggage of the Ali Musjid column which was on camels came also by the Chora Kandao, but did not reach Barar Kats till half-past eight o'clock in the evening, having been fired on about a mile before reaching camp. Almost immediately after dark, a few of the enemy opened fire on the troops, but, being replied to by the picquets, they soon desisted.

On the same day, the 25th of January, Brig.-General F. E. Appleyard, C.B., marched from Ali Musjid by the Alachai

<i>Ali Musjid Column.</i>		
		<i>All ranks.</i>
11-9th Royal Artillery (2 guns) ..	18	
51st Foot ..	213	
Madras Sappers and Miners ..	31	
2nd Gurkha Regiment ..	312	
Mhairwara Battalion ..	320	
<i>From Landi Kotal.</i>		
6th Native Infantry ..	311	

route to Karamna, where, at noon, the column under his command effected a junction with the 6th Native Infantry, under Colonel G. H. Thompson, who had marched the same morning from Landi Kotal by the Bori pass. The rest of the day was occupied in blowing up the towers of Karamna.

At seven o'clock on the morning of this day, the troops from the 1st Division, strength as in margin, under the command of Brig.-General J. A. Tytler, V.C., C.B., marched from Basawal. Four companies, under Colonel H. R. L. Newdigate, 4th Battalion, Rifle Brigade, were detached en route to destroy a cave village inhabited by robbers. The inhabitants had fled from it, but the village was, as far as possible, destroyed.

<i>Basawal Column.</i>		
		<i>All ranks.</i>
11-9th Royal Artillery (2 guns) ..	25	
1-17th Foot ..	361	
4th Battalion Rifle Brigade ..	210	
Guide Cavalry ..	32	
Bengal Sappers and Miners ..	43	
4th Gurkha Regiment ..	291	

This column reached Chenar at three o'clock in the afternoon,

<i>Dakka Column</i>		<i>All ranks.</i>	where it was joined by a force, strength as in margin, from Dakka, under Lieut.-Colonel F. M. Armstrong, commanding 45th Sikhs. Chenar was deserted by its inhabitants, but, as the villagers of this place had been concerned in cattle robberies from Dakka, their two towers were blown up, and the village destroyed.
1-17th Foot	..	52	
27th Punjab Native Infantry	..	104	
45th (Battray's) Sikhs	..	257	

On the 26th this column continued its march. Five hundred infantry with a party of sappers were detached under Lieut.-Colonel Armstrong to attack and destroy the village of Kasaba.¹ This was effected with slight resistance, the villagers taking to the mountains. Their tower was blown up, and the detachment rejoined the main column.

A short march of four miles brought the column to the Sisobi villages, the inhabitants of which had also been concerned in cattle stealing. The villages were found deserted, and the inhabitants refused to come in when invited to do so by the Brigadier-General. The villages were therefore destroyed, but the towers were left standing, out of consideration for the services rendered by some of the people as guides during the former expedition.

Meanwhile, the Ali Musjid column marched on the morning of this day, the 26th of January, on Barg, to which place some troops were detached from the Jamrud column at Barar Kats to effect a junction with it. These two columns, having united at Barg and blown up the towers of that place, continued their march to the Bazar valley.

The remainder of the Jamrud column had meanwhile continued its advance, but, during the march, the rear-guard was attacked by the enemy near the Obcha Tangi,² and two Gurkhas were wounded.

On the 27th of January, four companies of infantry, with a party of sappers, were detached from the Basawal column at seven o'clock in the morning, to seize and repair the Sisobi pass, which had been partly blocked. It was occupied

¹ Illi, as well as the Sisobi village, belongs to the Mullagoris.

² A ravine between Barar Kats and Chuni.

without opposition, and the road made practicable for camels. This column resumed its march at half-past nine in the morning, and, on arriving at the summit of the pass, was met by a detachment of 400 men, under Colonel C. M. MacGregor, from the Jamrud force. The further advance of this column was entirely unopposed, so that at four o'clock in the afternoon the three columns were united in the Bazar valley under Lieut.-General Maude.

At daybreak on this date, 300 men, under Colonel J. A. Ruddell, 25th Foot, were detached from the Jamrud column to scour the China hill, while a party of cavalry, under Lieut.-Colonel R. C. Low, 13th Bengal Lancers, was sent round to the west of the hill to cut off the retreat of any of the enemy in that direction. These measures were so far successful that some seven or eight of the enemy who remained on the hill were killed.

There could be no doubt of the hostile feelings of the Zakha Khel Afridis towards the troops, as, directly the force entered their country, it was fired on by day and also by night. The inhabitants had also deserted their villages, and set fire to them, although the Political Officer had told them that they would not be molested. None of these people showed themselves in the daytime to the troops, but they kept prowling about the hills and ravines, and fired at small parties. This sort of warfare was not formidable, and, though somewhat harassing to the troops, was more so to the enemy.

On the 27th, the Lieutenant-General determined the following day to reconnoitre in force the Bokar pass towards Bara. There seemed every chance of this step being resisted, and the country was quite unknown to any one with the column. A force of 1,000 men with two mountain guns was therefore detailed, under the command of Brig.-General Tytler, to accompany Lieut.-General Maude whilst carrying out this reconnaissance.

On the arrival of the force at Halwai, two miles from camp, the enemy opened fire from a hill opposite that village, and the advance was contested from that point till within 1,100 yards of the Bokar pass. The enemy was, however, forced to abandon each successive position, and a good view of the pass and of the surrounding hills was obtained before returning. The rear-guard reached camp just at dusk, the enemy not venturing to follow up the column beyond

the high ground near Halwai. The casualties on this occasion were, one sepoy of the 4th Gurkhas killed, Lieutenant H. R. L. Holmes, 45th Sikhs, one sergeant, 11-9th Royal Artillery, and two *kahars* wounded. The loss of the enemy was admitted to be fifteen killed.

The following day a detachment of 450 bayonets, under Colonel G. H. Thompson, commanding 6th Native Infantry, was detached to blow up the towers of Halwai, where fire had been first opened on the troops the day before. The towers were demolished, but, on the return march of this detachment through the low hills to the south of the camp, the whole country at once became alive with the enemy. The detachment threw out skirmishers, as it fell back, and inflicted a loss, estimated at twenty men, on the Afridis, while the casualties on our side were one killed and five wounded.

It was now becoming apparent that an Afridi war might develop itself if the troops forced their way into Bara. Should this further complication arise, a grave responsibility would be incurred by the Lieut.-General Commanding the force, in the absence of specific instructions from Government, notwithstanding the assurance of the Political Officer that any combination of other clans with the Zakha Khels was altogether improbable.

Those officers with the column, such as Brig.-General J. A. Tytler and Colonel C. M. MacGregor, who had had experience of the hill tribes, fully concurred in the opinion that an Afridi war would be started should the troops make any further advance. Lieut.-General Maude felt, therefore, that in what appeared to him a question of great delicacy, he required, before he pushed on into Bara, the opinion of a political officer of higher standing than Captain Tucker, although nothing could exceed the energy displayed by that officer in endeavouring to get the best information, and to settle matters satisfactorily.

The Political Officer on the Khaibar and Jalalabad line, Major P. L. N. Cavagnari, was therefore requested by telegraph to join the column if possible, the reason for this request being at the same time explained to him: but he was unable at that time to leave Jalalabad, where he then was with the 1st Division. Peshawar Valley Field Force.

On the evening of this day, the 29th of January, a circular was received from Army Head-Quarters addressed to officers commanding columns in Afghanistan, in which the Commander-in-Chief reminded them of the Viceroy's proclamation of the 21st of November 1878, and requested them to bear in mind that the British Government had declared war, not against the people of Afghanistan or adjoining tribes, but against the Amir, Sher Ali, and his troops. The letter further directed them individually to use their utmost endeavours to avoid provoking unnecessary collisions with the tribes and other inhabitants of the country, and to render its occupation as little burdensome to them as possible. As this communication, though in the form of a circular, was addressed to the General Officer Commanding by name, and was dated four days subsequent to the telegram according sanction to the expedition, while there was nothing to show that its contents were not applicable to the existing state of things with the expeditionary force, Lieut.-General Maude felt, upon its receipt, more than ever the responsibility attached to his position.

This position on the 30th of January was as follows:—A limit of ten days, of which that day was the fourth, had been fixed by Government for the expedition; conciliation, in accordance with the wishes of Government, as appeared from the above-mentioned circular, was to be adopted; the hostile attitude of the tribesmen rendered an advance impossible without encountering the resistance of a combination of clans; the conviction of the General Officer Commanding was that it was not the time when Government would wish to risk the commencement of an Afridi war.

Lieut.-General Maude, therefore, determined to ask for more explicit orders, and he accordingly telegraphed to Army Head-Quarters on that day (the 30th), and, having explained the situation, asked for specific instructions as to his future proceedings, and whether he was to force his way into the Bara valley against such opposition as he might meet.

On the evening of the 30th of January, Captain Tucker reported that although on the previous day he had informed the Lieut.-General that sections of the Zakha Khels alone were assembled to dispute the advance of the troops, he had since learned that members of other clans had assembled, some from a considerable

This was followed by the arrival in camp, on the first of February, of a deputation from all the sections of the Bara Zakha Khels. They expressed themselves desirous of opening friendly relations, attesting their sincerity on this point by bringing in with them some of the camels which had been stolen from the troops some time before in the Khaibar pass.

On the 2nd of February the Political Officer reported that he had come to terms with the *jirga*, which he considered to be satisfactory; and it then became possible for orders to be issued for the return of the three columns to their respective stations on the following day.

The same evening the Lieutenant-General received a telegram in reply to his of the 30th and 31st, informing him that the instructions of Government regarding avoiding unnecessary collisions with the people of Afghanistan were to be accepted as general, and applicable more particularly to tribes which had hitherto been directly under Afghan rule, and that there was nothing, in the instructions referred to, to prevent Lieut.-General Maude carrying out the expedition into the Bara valley. He was also informed that he was left free, in consultation with Mr. D. C. Macnabb, the Commissioner of Peshawar, who had been invested with full political powers, and had been directed to join him at once, to act on his own judgment in carrying out the intention for which the expedition was planned.

On the receipt of these instructions the Lieutenant-General decided to adhere to the orders he had previously issued for the whole force to commence its return march on the following day. This decision was chiefly caused by the sudden recall of Brig.-General Tytler's force, as it was necessary for it to march the following morning if it was to arrive in time at Jalalabad and Dakka to meet the expected attack upon these places. In addition to this, the Political Officer stated that he was satisfied with the terms to which the Bara Zakha Khels had agreed. He was also of opinion that a more lengthened occupation of the valley would cause much irritation, and lead to a risk of collision with other tribes with whom the Government had no quarrel. General Maude was inclined to agree with this view, as there was no doubt that considerable detachments from various tribes were massed in the

Bara passes. Nor could there be any two opinions on this head, that though the troops were perfectly able to force their way into the Bara valley, such a step would bring on a war in which all the tribes from the Bazar valley to Kurram would join; while to stay in the Bazar valley longer would be very likely to cause the representatives of these tribes to commit acts of hostility which would call for immediate retaliation by the troops.

On the 3rd of February, therefore, the different columns left the Bazar valley—Brig.-General Tytler by the Sisobi pass for Dakka, the troops of the 2nd Division by Chora for Jamrud and Ali Musjid respectively.

The Political Officer with the column was expressly informed that no settlement of the case would be considered satisfactory if the columns were fired at on their return march. He was directed to inform the Zakha Khels that if shots were fired, the troops would, sooner or later, to a certainty, return. That none of the columns, contrary to Afridi custom, were molested during their withdrawal, may be taken as a proof of the sincerity of their submission.

The British casualties in the above operations amounted to five killed, and thirteen wounded.

After this expedition the Zakha Khel Afridis showed a disposition for a time to remain friendly, but at the end of March they again began to give trouble, and continued to do so until the termination of the first phase of the operations in Afghanistan by the Treaty of Gandamak in May.

On the withdrawal of the British army in June, the Afridis of the Khaibar pass did not attempt to molest the troops, except in one instance, in which they made an attack on the baggage of the 9th Lancers on the 6th of June, when two cartmen were killed, and some property of the officers stolen.

After the termination of the first campaign in June 1879, arrangements for the safety of the Khaibar were made with the Afridis. The leading representatives of the clans were summoned to Peshawar from Tirah, and, after long negotiations, consented to serve under the British Government for the same allowances which they had been wont to receive, though somewhat irregularly, from the Kabul Durbar. A large force of *jazailchis*, under a

selected officer, was appointed to patrol the road, escort convoys, and relieve the military of the onerous duties of watch and ward. These arrangements worked very satisfactorily, and from the beginning of the second campaign to April 1880 the security and quiet of the Khaibar pass were almost unbroken. Two raids attempted by Zakha Khel Afridis, in October 1879, were punished by the Afridis themselves; the Khusrogis, the offending section, were compelled to pay a fine of Rs. 800, and to surrender hostages for good behaviour.

In April 1880 the misconduct of the Nasr-ud-din Khel and Annai sections of the Zakha Khels gave some trouble, and the hostages who had been taken as security for the good behaviour of these, the most turbulent sections of the Khaibar Afridis, absconded. Shortly after, a *saiyid*, named Mir Bashir, of Tirah, with the countenance of Mulla Wali Khan, a devotee of great influence among all the Afridis, took advantage of the discontent which existed among certain sections of the Zakha Khels, and proclaimed himself *Badshah* of Tirah. He found followers principally among the Malikdin Khels and Kambar Khels, and levied money and grain contributions as tribute, and for the supplies of the army which he endeavoured to raise and drill in his support.

Under his influence, and at the instigation of an ex-*malik* of the Sipah clan, several raids were committed in the month of June, and an expedition to Tirah was proposed; but the emergency was not considered to be sufficiently grave to call for so important a movement, and shortly after this the influence of Mir Bashir died away. The Afridis were never seriously inclined to exchange their democratic freedom for the rule of a priest who demanded revenue and took tithe of their crops and herds, and this, combined with doubts of the sincerity of his religious pretensions, caused his popularity to wane as fast as it had risen.

The British army which had been in occupation of Northern Afghanistan returned through the Khaibar at the end of August and beginning of September 1880. The pass remained quiet, and there were no attempts, even on the part of isolated fanatics or bad characters, to plunder stores or molest the camps at night. The positions at Ali Musjid and Landi Kotal continued to be held by our troops, but in the month of September the Government of India announced

its determination to withdraw the regular forces stationed in the Khaibar, if satisfactory arrangements could be made to keep the pass open under the independent and exclusive charge of the clans. No time was recordingly lost in summoning the representative headmen of the Khaibar clans, of whom more than 300 assembled in Peshawar towards the end of that month. It was found necessary to give the headmen time to discuss matters among themselves, and to secure the consent of sections still absent in Tirah and Bara to the arrangements which were proposed. They had also, before any agreement could be made, to undertake the coercion of the Khusrogis and Paindai Zakha Khels. In this they succeeded, and in January 1881 a complete *jirga* of all the Khaibar clans was collected at Peshawar, where their headmen affixed their seals to a final agreement with the British Government on the 17th February 1881.

The terms of this agreement were as follows:—

- (1) Independence of Afridis to be recognized, but no interference by any other power than Great Britain to be allowed.
- (2) In consideration of certain allowances, the Afridis to undertake to maintain order throughout the Khaibar.
- (3) All matters concerning pass arrangements to be submitted to a general meeting of representatives from all the clans.
- (4) No traveller to enter the pass without an order.
- (5) The clans not to require military aid from India, for the defence of the pass, but the Government of India to be allowed to re-occupy the pass at pleasure.
- (6) The clans to furnish such a number of *jazailchis* as the Government might direct, with head-quarters at Jamrud; to be subject to the political inspection, and to be paid by the British Government, but not to constitute a government force.
- (7) All tolls, etc., to belong to the Government.
- (8) Offences on the road to be dealt with by a general *jirga* reporting to the Government.
- (9) The clans to abstain from committing outrages in British territory.
- (10—15) Minor arrangements with reference to the custody of Ali Masjid and other Government buildings in the pass; to undertakings to forward posts and expresses at any time; and to the territorial limits of tribal responsibility, viz., Landi Khana on the west, and Jamrud on the east.

The British Government engaged to continue the subsidies which had hitherto been paid on the following scale:—

				Rs.	
<i>Afridis</i>	..	Kuki Khel	1,300	<i>per mensem.</i>
		Malikdin Khel	1,300	" "
		Kambar Khel	500	" "
		Kamrai	250	" "
		Zakha Khel	1,700	" "
		Sipah	1,300	" "
¹ <i>Shinwaris of Loargai</i>			805	" "
Total				7,155	" "
				or 85,860 per annum.	

Besides the above, there were small special allowances to minor headmen, who rendered service in the first campaign, but had to give place to the old tribal chiefs when they made submission after the peace of Gandamak. These allowances raised the annual subsidies to a total of Rs. 87,540.

The position of the *jazailchis* was entirely changed in the new arrangement. The British Government now merely paid the cost of their maintenance, a sum amounting to about Rs. 87,160 per annum; but they were to be appointed and dismissed by the chiefs of the clans concerned, who were solely responsible for their management, reporting their arrangements to the Political Officer at Jamrud. The strength of this body was about 550 men, with the usual complement of subadars, jemadars, and subordinate officers.

¹ The *Shinwaris* are a powerful tribe, numbering between 11,000 and 12,000 fighting men, who reside in Ningrahar. With the exception of one small section, they have in ordinary times no dealings with the British, and therefore do not come within the scope of the present work. The only occasions on which we have come into contact with them were during the first Afghan war, and during the operations in 1878-80. In November 1841 this tribe attacked the British post at Pesh Bolak, and in the following year an expedition was sent into their country to inflict punishment. In the last campaign in Afghanistan they caused considerable annoyance on our line of communications, and several punitive expeditions were sent against them.

The *Shinwaris* are divided into four clans—(I) Mandelzai; (II) Sangu Khel; (III) Ali Sher Khel; and (IV) Sipah. Members of the Ali Sher Khel clan inhabit the Loargai valley about Landi Kotal in the Khaibar, and are known as the Loargai *Shinwaris*. This is the only portion of the tribe within the British sphere of influence.

The Loargai *Shinwaris* number about 850 fairly well-armed fighting men. They retain close relations with their kinsmen across the border and can, at all times, count on the latter coming to their assistance. They are fairly well off, and cultivate all the available land in the Loargai plain; their habitations are substantial fortified homesteads.

When these arrangements were complete and in working order, the British troops were withdrawn, on the 21st of March 1881, from the positions they had held at Ali Musjid and Landi Kotal.

The pass was after that date entirely protected by *jazailchis*; and the arrangements made with the Khaibar Afridis were found to work satisfactorily. Tolls on caravans commenced to be levied on the 15th September 1881, and the income from this source was estimated at about 60,000 rupees per annum. The first occasion on which the traffic in the Khaibar was molested was on the 21st of February 1882, when, as a demonstration, a body of Zakha Khels, chiefly belonging to the Annai section, attempted an unsuccessful raid on a caravan about three miles from Ali Musjid. Due warning of their intention had been previously received, and the two Zakha Khel companies of the *jazailchis*, with half of the Malikdin Khel company, repulsed the marauders with a loss of four men killed and ten wounded, before they could attack the travellers on the road. Shortly afterwards the offending section of the Zakha Khels submitted. It seems that they had reason to be discontented with the conduct of the Zakha Khel *maliks* in the distribution of the tribal subsidy, and their action is to be attributed more to this cause than to a desire to break the treaty which provided for the management of the pass by the Afridis. Measures were taken to remove their causes for discontent by a re-allotment of the Zakha Khel subsidy. At the same time the opportunity was taken to bring the distant section of the Zia-ud-din, which inhabits a tract in the Bara valley, detached from the main settlements of the Zakha Khels, into closer connection with the responsibility of the clan for all its sub-divisions.

Unconnected with the affairs of the Khaibar and our general relations with the Afridis were the two night attacks by Kamal, Malikdin Khel, and his gang, on picquets of native cavalry at Peshawar and Kohat. In the first, which occurred on the night of the 19th of July 1881, Kamal, with eight associates, surprised a post on the road leading from the Peshawar cantonment to Jamrud. Of the duffadar and six men who formed the picquet, three were killed and three badly wounded, and four of their carbines were carried off. The raiders escaped unpunished, owing to the darkness of the night, the rugged and broken nature of the ground they traversed, and the precaution they took of cutting the telegraph wire

to Jamrud. On the night of the 20th of September 1881 a similar carefully planned and boldly executed attack was delivered on the quarter-guard of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry at Kohat, by Kamal and eight or nine companions belonging to the Malikdin Khel clan. On this occasion three sowars were killed and four wounded, and two carbines were taken. Of the raiders, two were wounded, of whom one was abandoned by his comrades, and was captured near the *kotal* of the Kohat pass the next morning. He subsequently died of his wounds.

The audacity of these raids brought them into conspicuous notice, but it was clear that they were not the outcome of collective tribal ill-feeling against the British, nor prompted by any expectation of plunder, but were the acts of individual border ruffians who were actuated by personal motives of revenge. Kamal himself, who had served in our army, where he acquired a knowledge of military routine which materially facilitated the execution of his plans, lost a brother, and two near relatives of his associates were killed, in a raid which they attempted, in February 1881, on cattle of Peshawar villages grazing on the Aka Khel border. Nevertheless, these raids constituted a breach of the engagement by which the Khaibar clans had bound themselves to prevent such outrages. It was therefore required of them either to surrender the raiders to justice, or to pay a fine of Rs. 7,000, and to exclude Kamal from the Afridi country. Both the demands involved in the second alternative were obeyed without hesitation, and a heavy reward was offered for the capture of Kamal. Fines were also levied from the clans who permitted him to pass through their limits to Kohat.

On the 6th of January 1883, the outlaw Kamal, with the assistance of some men of his own clan and of the Basi Khel section of the Aka Khels, having returned to Basi Khel territory, made a raid on British territory and carried off four horses and a mule belonging to a British officer marching from Peshawar towards Matanni, and the stolen animals were given a passage through the Aka Khel limits to the Orakzai country. The horses were, however, brought back in the following March by the Aka Khels. The Malikdin Khels were also to some extent implicated in this offence, as, contrary to the express agreement with Government into

which they had entered, they had permitted Kamal to return to the tribal settlement in Maidan, whence he had started to commit this raid. The Malikdin Khels were accordingly fined Rs. 780, and the Basi Khels Rs. 750.

Meanwhile the Aka Khels, since the punishment they had received in 1855, had been generally well behaved ; and the most important offence committed by them of late years had been the destruction of a police post in course of construction on their border in October 1880. For this offence a fine of Rs. 1,000, with Rs. 1,200 compensation, was recovered from the clan.

Our further dealings with the Khaibar and Aka Khel Afridis will be reserved for a fresh chapter.

APPENDIX A.

Genealogy of the Zakha Khel Afridis.

CLANS.	Divisions.	Sub-divisions.	Sections.	
ZAKHA KHEL ..	NASH-UD-DIN ..	Habib Khel or Paindal	Wasul Khel.	
			Dreplari.	
		Khusrugi ..	Durar.	
			Dreplari.	
		Pakhal ..	Walli Khel.	
			Saddo Khel.	
			Hassan Khel.	
			Shekawal.	
			Sikandar Khel.	
			Miri Khel.	
	BUDAI ..	Ziauddin ..	Burat Kor.	
			Kakal Kor.	
		Annal ..	Shekhal.	
			Bash Khel.	
		SHANAI OR SHAN KHEL.	Balajhol ..	Umar Khel.
				Sultan Khel.
	Usman Khel		Moghal Khel.	
			Tarki Khel.	
	Umar Beg Khel		

APPENDIX B.

Genealogy of the Aka Khel Afridis.

CLANS.	Divisions.	Sub-divisions.	Sections.
AKA KHEL ..	SABTO JAW ..	Kamal Kbel..	Sanzal Kbel or Sanzal Kbel.
			Basl Kbel. Ashraf Kbel.
	SHER GULLA ..	Madda Kbel ..	Darri Kbel.
			Mr Khan Kbel.
		Sultan Kbel..	Shinol Kbel.
			Kob Kbel. Utam Kbel. Azad Kbel.
	MIRI KHEL
		

APPENDIX C.

Genealogy of the Malikdin Khel and Sipah Afridis.

CLANS.	Divisions.	Sub-divisions.	Sections.		
MALIKDIN KHEL ..	DAULAT KHEL ..	Lar Daulat Khel ..	Umar Khel. Mohmand Khel.		
		Bar Daulat Khel		
		Wand Khel		
	UMAR KHAN KHEL ..	Umar Khan Khel ..	Kuddi Khel. Sher Khan Khel.		
	KULA KARNA KHEL ..	Kula Khel		
		Karna Khel		
	SIPAH ..	URMUZ KHEL ..	Landi Khel ..	Wand Garhat, Ali Khel. Abdul Rahim Khel. Ibrahim Khel.	
				Kelmal Khel ..	Mul Khel. Baghdad Khel. Babur Khel.
					Abdul Khel..
			BABAKRI KHEL ..		
Ghalbi Khel ..				Mamli Khel. Kasim Khel. Kalm Khel. Sultan Khel. Miri Khel.	
				Jawakat ..	Khatti Khel ..
Ali Khel. Khumari Khel.					

APPENDIX D.

Genealogy of the Kamrai Afridis.

CLANS.	Divisions.	Sub-divisions.	Sections.
KAMRAI OR KAMAR KHEL.	KHAWADAD KHEL OR (BAR KAMRAIS).	Sob Khel	Gawar Khel.
			Sarwar Khel.
			Shamsher Khel.
			Shudli Khel.
		Azad Khel	Hukdad Khel.
			Khanzad Khel.
			Amir Khan Khel.
			Mirdad Khel.
		Mughul Khel	Khujai Khel.
			Tarkial Khel.
	MUGHAL KHEL	Khwas Khel
		Palinda Khel
		Amel Khel
	DAEMI KHEL
	YAR ALI KHEL	Ikhtyar Khel
		Ayub Khel
		Musa Khel
	SHEKH ALI KHEL	Tor Khel
		Kull Khel
		Hassan Khel
		Kud Khel

APPENDIX E.

Genealogy of the Kuki Khel Afridis.

CLANS.	Divisions.	Sub-divisions.	Sections.
KUKI KHEL ..	SIKANDAR KHEL ..	Usman Khel ..	Mr Kalan Khel.
		Zakku Khel ..	Multani Khel.
	MITHA KHAN KHEL ..	Assad Khel ..	Wali Khel.
			Maddu Khel.
		Hasan Khel ..	Karun Khel.
			Tor Khel.
	ABDAL KHEL ..	Fateh Khel ..	Kattin Khel.
		Umar Khel ..	Mannia Khel.
		Khadak Khel ..	Yari Khel.
		Madar Khel ..	Sheri Khel.
		
		

APPENDIX F.

Genealogy of the Kambar Khel Afridis.

CLASS	Divisions.	Sub-divisions.	Sections.
KAMBAR KHEL ..	KAMBAR KHEL ..	Masli-Khel (Dreplari) ..	Zamia Khel.
			Umar Khel.
		Pabbi Khel (Dreplari) ..	Jan Beg Khel.
			Yargul Khel.
		Shekimal Khel ..	Miran Khel.
			Yaran Khel.
			Kaim Khel.
			Ali Khel.
			Sullman Khel.
			Wardurbi Khel.
			Aziz Khel.
			Gohar Khel.
			Azar Khel.
			Jalil Khel.
			Ramsher Khel.
	MAY KHAN KHEL ..	Sher Khel
		Wali Beg Khel
		Dash Khel
		Mirza Beg Khel
		Sarbadar Khel
		Khojal Khel
		Ambar Khel ..	Goli Khel.

CHAPTER II.

THE AFRIDI TRIBE.—(Continued.)

Operations of the Tirah Expeditionary Force against the Khaibar and Aka Khel Afridis, in 1897-98.

AFTER the events described in the last chapter the conduct of the Afridis as a whole was good, and they kept faithfully to their treaty obligations. Certain specific cases of misconduct by individuals occurred, but received no support or encouragement from the bulk of the tribe; and no punitive measures were required up to the time of the outbreak in 1897. The most noteworthy minor case of misconduct occurred in July 1892, when Malik Amin Khan, Kuki Khel, aggrieved at having been deprived of half his *maliki* allowances on account of repeated misconduct, collected a *lashkar* of some 500 or 600 men and attacked the Khaibar. This *lashkar* occupied a hill above Shadi Bagiar to the south of the east entrance of the Khaibar on the evening of the 4th July 1892, and during the ensuing night made attacks on Shadi Bagiar, Jehangira, and Fort Maude just inside the pass. The *mullas* in Tirah combined to try and persuade the other Afridi clans to join, but without success. As soon as news of the approach of this *lashkar* became known, reinforcements, consisting of 200 men of the 14th Sikhs, 100 men of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, and 2 field guns, were despatched to Jamrud.

Hearing of the arrival of these troops Amin Khan's gathering dispersed early on the morning of the 5th July, without a man of the Jamrud garrison advancing a yard beyond that place.

Before proceeding to describe the part played by the Afridi tribe in the rising of 1897, it may be of advantage to give a brief resumé of the causes which are put forward as the most important factors in explanation of that sudden and, at the time, almost unaccountable display of hostility towards the British Government.

Probable causes of the rising.

As was narrated in the last chapter, on the 17th February 1881, the independence of the Khaibar clans was recognized, whilst they, on their part, accepted entire and exclusive responsibility for the safeguarding of the Khaibar pass, and bound themselves to commit no offences in British territory, to levy no tolls, and to have no political dealings with Kabul. Article No. 5 of the Afridis' agreement expressly states—"Our responsibility for the security of the road is independent of aid from Government in the form of troops. It lies with the discretion of Government to retain its troops within the Pass or to withdraw them and to re-occupy at pleasure." The terms of this agreement should be borne in mind when estimating the sincerity and truthfulness of their petitions to the Amir of Afghanistan, subsequent to the outbreak of 1897, to the effect that our hold on the Khaibar was an act of tyranny on the part of Government and an infringement of their treaty rights. The only change introduced into the management of the Pass was the gradual development of the corps of *jeczailchis* into the "Khaibar Rifles," their armament being improved by the provision of Snider rifles at Government expense, and a British officer (the late Captain Barton of the Guides) being appointed Commandant in 1896. But neither on this point nor on any other did they give any sign of discontent, and our relations with them continued to be most friendly, until the sudden and wholly unlooked for outbreak in August 1897 again forced us into hostilities with almost the whole of the Khaibar Afridis.

The relative importance of the different causes predisposing to this outbreak is a point upon which authorities greatly differ. This much is certain, that the reasons put forward by the tribes themselves do not embody the real causes which formed the mainspring of their action, nor, even if well grounded, would such comparatively trivial grievances as the enhancement of the salt-tax, the non-restitution of certain runaway women, etc., have proved sufficient motive for so violent and universal an uprising and so widespread a combination amongst tribes separated by such bitter feuds, mutually jealous and suspicious of one another, and so difficult to arouse to common and concerted action. The various reasons given for their action, including their own pretexts subsequently alleged, will be given in detail; but which of them formed the most direct and powerful incentive is a matter that is never

likely to be known. Religious fanaticism, however it may have been originally aroused and inflamed, was undoubtedly the immediate incentive. The preaching of the *mullas* can always be relied upon to fan an incipient flame of the kind: they are always, amongst the Pathan tribes, ill-disposed towards a settled form of government, as their own power and prestige suffer in proportion to the growth of a strong and respected central authority. They are impartially hostile to any form of government, Muhammadan included, which attempts to substitute any code of law and order for a régime in which their own powers are so extensive.

At first sight, the theory that the successes of the Turkish troops against the Greeks, in the campaign which immediately preceded the risings of 1897, had a marked effect in rousing their dormant fanaticism, might seem somewhat far-fetched. But if we consider the ignorance and credulity of these tribesmen, and how wholly dependent they are for news of the outside world upon *mullas*, and others directly interested in misleading them, it becomes apparent that such an event as the war in question—in which the true believer undoubtedly did get much the better of the infidel Greek, as could be proved to the satisfaction of the tribesmen from our own newspaper accounts—might form a most powerful weapon in the hands of the *mullas*, who could place their own interpretation upon events, and colour them to their liking, without the tribesmen being able to detect the slenderness of the foundations upon which the huge structure of misrepresentation was raised. To what an extraordinary extent garbled and exaggerated accounts of current events passed for facts amongst them, can be understood from the letter, found in Mulla Saiyid Akbar's house, quoted in full in Appendix A.

To us, of course, it is quite evident that a war between Greece and Turkey may be carried to any conclusion without affecting relations between England and the Sultan. To the Afridi, such nice distinctions as the difference between a Greek and an Englishman are hardly worthy of consideration. The infidels had made war upon Islam; the Almighty had given victory to the true believer; all infidels are alike "tarred with the same brush"; now, when the Musalman was everywhere victorious, was the auspicious time: now the tide might be taken at the flood. The noisy sentimentality of some few English partisans and sympathisers with

the Greeks, and the much advertised departure of certain volunteers to their assistance, duly recorded, with more prominence and detail than their importance merited. in all our newspapers, may have proved, in the hands of the *mullas*, incontestible evidence that the English as a whole not only sympathised with the Greeks, but were fighting on their side.

Allusion has been made above to the Musalman being everywhere victorious. The Afridi was told, and believed, that the victory of his co-religionists all along the Indian Frontier was as brilliant and complete as it had been in Europe. That the treacherous attack on Colonel Bunny and his party in the Tochi was successful, that many British officers had been killed, and that Government had not been able, up to the time of the Afridi outbreak, to avenge the outrage, lost nothing in the telling when told in Tirah. On the top of this came the news of the attack on the Malakand, distorted by the *mullas* to represent a brilliant and complete victory for the tribesmen, and a crushing defeat for the British.

Another motive which probably, in conjunction with religious fanaticism, had some effect on the action of the tribesmen, and which is put forward by some writers as the principal incentive for their hostility, was suspicion of the motives prompting us to delimit the frontier between Afghanistan and independent territory by the Durand Line. Ignorant, fanatical, and fiercely jealous of their independence, the tribesmen had always looked askance at the frontier delimitation proceedings, and with misgivings as to our ultimate intentions. Even the Amir himself was suspicious of our motives, and his hostility to the whole proceeding—to the necessity of which he had in the beginning reluctantly agreed—became so pronounced and unmistakable towards the end of the delimitation, that demarkation of the boundary through the Mohmand country had to be abandoned. That many of the tribesmen regarded the delimitation and parcelling out of their country as the first preliminary to the destruction, or at any rate, the curtailment, of their independence, was marked by them in a very decided manner by the attack of the Mahsud Wazirs upon the Boundary Commission and its escort at Wana on the 3rd November 1894, as will be related when dealing with that tribe. At a time of unrest and excitement, this feeling, skilfully worked on, was in all probability another lever in the hands of the malcontents.

Yet another factor, and one of whose importance we have the most ample proof, was the universal feeling amongst the tribesmen that they could rely not only upon the approval and moral support, but also upon the active intervention in their favour, of the Amir of Afghanistan. His attitude towards them was persistently misrepresented. The *mullas* were preaching a *jehad*; and the Amir had just written a book on the same subject, and had also assumed the title of "Light of Union and of the Faith." In the minds of the more primitive Muhammadans, religious activity and violence are always rather closely connected: and the Amir's book undoubtedly was used as a proof that His Majesty was with them heart and hand.

Whilst the Amir's name was being thus freely used, and every endeavour was being made to involve, or at any rate to compromise, him in the struggle, His Majesty maintained a perfectly correct attitude towards his ally. His position, however, was extremely difficult and delicate; and in letters to the Government of India he dwelt upon the immense difficulties he had himself had in dealing with religious fanaticism, and maintained that the Hadda Mulla, the chief instigator of the troubles, was just as much an enemy to himself as to the British, and had been active in stirring up the Afghans on former occasions to rebel against him. He promised to use his utmost endeavours to prevent his own subjects from taking any part in the risings, but pointed out his inability to disarm or arrest independent tribesmen taking refuge with their families in his dominions, as they were closely allied to his own subjects by blood and marriage, and any such action on his part would result in a universal outburst of indignation against him. He pointed out that whereas the British Government had at its disposal Sikhs and Hindus, as well as British soldiers, for dealing with fanatics of this kind, he himself had no soldiers but those drawn from these very tribesmen, who would never consent to take action against their own kith and kin; but he promised to prevent his territories being used as a base of operations by the Afridis. On the 13th August he issued a proclamation in Pushtu, to the effect that he would not help or countenance any action hostile to the British Government. On the 17th August 1897, immediately after the Afridi outbreak, in public durbar at Kabul, he assured the whole assembly that he had

always adhered to his promises to the British Government, and that he had never instigated his subjects against it. A contingent of the Amir's subjects who had started to join the Afridis, from Tagao, north-west of Jalalabad, were stopped by his orders at the latter place: and a *lashkar* of several thousands of Afghans from Ningrahar, Kunar, and Jalalabad, on their way to join the *jihad*, were dispersed by his orders on the 1st September 1897. In the middle of September, a deputation of eighteen leading *maliks*, etc., of the Afridi and Orakzai tribes, on their way to make a petition to the Amir at Kabul, were stopped at Jalalabad by His Majesty's orders and sent back, their petition for assistance in money, guns, and troops being peremptorily refused. On the 17th October His Majesty received the Afridi and Orakzai *jirgas* in a brief interview, but refused to change his attitude.

His Excellency the Viceroy accepted the assurances of the Amir and thanked him for his friendly attitude.

With regard to the Amir's book on *jihad*, and his assumption in 1896 of the title "Light of Union and the Faith," his action appears to have been prompted by self defence, with a view to silencing the machinations of the *mullas* against him. The nature of the struggle between him and them has already been alluded to: and he seems to have taken this course with a view to strengthening his own position by proclaiming himself the leader of religion in his own country. The admission in the letter of the Afridi *jirga*, given in Appendix A, that "His Highness advised us not to fight with the British Government, and this was and has been his advice ever since," bears independent witness to his sincerity.

Either from secret sympathy with the organizers of the outbreak,—for he had been for years a personal friend of the Hadda Mulla,—from a supposition that in assisting the tribesmen he would be strengthening the position of the Amir at the expense of the British Government, from fanaticism, or from a mixture of all three motives, the *Sipah Salar*,¹ Ghulam Haidar, took up a different attitude from the Amir; and his total neglect to restrain the subjects of the Amir under his immediate control, and even the regular troops, from joining the insurgents, formed the subject of vigorous protests from the Government of India.

¹ Afghan Commander-in-Chief,

In conclusion the following reasons for their action, given by the Chamkannis in reply to Sir W. Lockart's proclamation, probably embodied the most compelling causes for the action of all the tribes.

Friendship and enmity are not in our choice; whatever orders we may receive from the *Fakir Sahib* of Swat, the *Mulla Sahib* of Hadda or the Aka Khel Mulla, and from all Islam, we cannot refuse to obey them; if we lose our lives, no matter.

The following is a brief resumé of the events which immediately preceded the Afridi outbreak, and which are dealt with at length in other parts of this work :—

On the 10th. June 1897, without the slightest warning being given Events which preceded the Afridi outbreak. of any discontent amongst the tribes concerned, the escort to the Political Officer in the Tochi, who was engaged in collecting a small fine for admitted misconduct by the Madda Khel sub-division of the Darwesh Khel Wazirs, was treacherously attacked, the British officers shot down, and the escort forced to retire, with considerable loss, on Datta Khel.¹

On the 26th July, with almost equal suddenness, the Malakand and Chakdara posts were assailed by vast numbers of tribesmen.² A few days before the attack on the Malakand, Major Deane, the Political Officer for Swat and Dir, had heard that a mad *fakir*, with a following of a few boys, was preaching against Government and trying to create trouble: a few hours only before the attack came, he learnt that the rising had spread like wild fire, that the tribesmen had joined in thousands, and that an attack was imminent. After a struggle lasting several days and nights, during which the tribesmen, in ever-increasing numbers, attacked with the most reckless courage, they were finally beaten off with losses estimated to exceed 3,000 men in killed, the total strength of the hostile gathering being estimated at 20,000 men.

On the 7th August, the Hadda Mulla, descending the Gandab valley, burnt the British frontier village of Shankargarh, and attacked the Shabkadar post, with a following of about 5,000 men, mostly Mohmands.³ Warning had been given of the

¹ See Chapter IX.

² See Chapter IX, Volume I.

³ See Chapter XI, Volume I.

impending danger, and when the attack came, a force was already marching from Peshawar to Shabkadar. This force arrived next morning, and, on the 9th, attacked the tribesmen and eventually defeated and drove them off with heavy loss.

As will be easily understood, the gravity of these events, and the knowledge that further risings amongst tribes not yet implicated were to be feared, imposed on Government the necessity of taking measures of precaution on a large scale, besides making immediate preparations to punish the offending tribesmen. The movements of the Afridis and Orakzais, the most powerful of the frontier tribes, were watched with anxiety, and the normal garrison of Peshawar was considerably strengthened, in order to safeguard that border.

As it had now become evident that very considerable forces

2nd Reserve Brigade.
 2nd Bn., Oxfordshire L. I.
 2nd Bn., Royal Irish Regt.
 1st Bn., 3rd Gurkhas.
 12th Bengal Infantry.
 No. 3 Mountain Battery.
 18th Bengal Lancers.
 No. 4 Coy., Bombay S. and M.
3rd Reserve Brigade.
 1st Bn., Northampton Regt.
 1st Bn., Dorset Regiment.
 9th Gurkhas.
 1st Bn., 2nd Gurkhas.
 3rd Field Battery.
 3rd Bengal Cavalry.
 No. 4 Coy., Madras S. and M.

would be required to cope with the situation created by these formidable and widespread outbreaks, as well as to deal with any fresh developments which might be caused by the rising spreading to the Afridis and Orakzais, orders were issued on the 14th August for the concentration at Rawalpindi of a 2nd and 3rd Reserve Brigade, as shown in the margin, under the command respectively of Brig.-General R. Westmacott, C.B., and Brig.-General A. G. Yeatman-Biggs, C.B. A 1st Reserve Brigade had already been formed in support of the column from the Malakand about to march into Swat under Sir Bindon Blood.

In addition to these concentrations, Brig.-General Elles,

"K" Battery, R. H. A.
 4th Dragoon Guards
 2 squadrons, 9th B. L.
 A wing, Devonshire Regt.
 A wing, Gordon Highlanders.
 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkhas.
 26th Punjab Infantry.

commanding at Peshawar, formed a second moveable column as shown in the margin, for the general protection of the border against the Afridis, with the special idea of its moving out to protect Jamrud, or the head of the Peshawar water-supply from the Bara river. It was intended that it should be available for any portion of the frontier in the vicinity of Peshawar not protected by the Shabkadar column, but not for any operations in the Khaibar pass. The garrison of regular

troops in Jamrud, ordinarily consisting of 100 rifles and 50 sabres, in addition to the Khaibar Rifles, was doubled, garrisons of regular troops being also placed in Forts Michni (50 carbines) and Abazai (100 rifles), in place of the Border Military Police.

Although these precautions were taken to prevent raiding into our territory, and the general situation as regards the Afridis was looked upon as disquieting, no very serious apprehension was felt for the safety of the Khaibar, which had now been for sixteen years held by the tribal levies with uniform good faith. It was expected that any trouble given by the turbulent members of that tribe would take the more normal form of raiding in force; and that, if they ventured into the plains, the striking force at Peshawar would be quite strong enough to deal with them.

The first definite news of unrest amongst the Afridis was received on the 4th August, when a telegram was received from the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat to the effect that Mulla Saiyid Akbar had succeeded in persuading the Orakzais to unite against Government, and was in Tirah endeavouring to persuade the Afridis to do the same.

The Commissioner of Peshawar (Sir Richard Udny) had, however, received other information from Tirah, which he considered reliable, to the effect that affairs there were fairly quiet; and he was consequently inclined to believe that the above report from Kohat gave an exaggerated idea of the situation. On the 15th August the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat again telegraphed to the effect that an Afridi *lashkar* had collected with the intention of attacking Jamrud, and that such action on the part of the Afridis would be followed by the Orakzais; but Sir Richard still declined to believe that the situation was as threatening as represented and telegraphed to Government that reports from reliable sources informed him that there was no serious or general movement either among Orakzais or Afridis.

As there was nothing so far to show in what direction an attack by the tribesmen, if it actually took place, might be delivered, the Government of the Punjab recommended the reinforcement of the garrison of Kohat, to provide for the eventuality of the Afridis and Orakzais breaking out to the south and south-east of their country. The advisability of this precaution is evident from a glance at the map, Kohat being isolated and,

at the time, unconnected by rail with Kushalgarh : whereas in and about Peshawar there was already a force of from 5,000 to 6,000 men, exclusive of the Shabkadar column, numbering about 2,500 more ; in addition to this Peshawar could be rapidly reinforced by rail, if necessary, from the reserve brigades at Rawalpindi.

9th Field Battery, R. A.
A wing, 1st Royal Scots Fus.
18th Bengal Lancers.
16th Sikhs

The Government of India accordingly sanctioned the immediate despatch to Kohat of the reinforcements in the margin, and also notified its intention to still further strengthen the forces in the Peshawar district.

On the evening of the 17th August, Colonel Aslam Khan, Officiating Political Officer in the Khaibar, arrived in Peshawar, bringing with him Malik Amin Khan, Kuki Khel, with the information that an Afridi *lashkar*, reported to be 10,000 strong, accompanied by 1,500 *mullas* from Ningrahar, had started from Bagh in Tirah on the 16th. with the intention of attacking the Khaibar posts, and that they might be expected there on the 18th. Sir Richard Udny and Brig.-General Elles decided against occupying Landi Kotal or other posts in the Khaibar with regular troops, not only because the question of supply, at short notice, would present great difficulties, but also because such a course would imply distrust in the intention of the tribesmen to keep to their treaty obligations, and in the loyalty of the Khaibar Rifles. The garrisons of the latter at the various posts had recently been strengthened : Landi Kotal, the most advanced and important post, had in particular had its garrison increased from 200 to 354 rifles, amply supplied with all stores, including 50,000 rounds of reserve ammunition.

Captain Barton, Commandant of the Khaibar Rifles, was at Landi Kotal at this time. Hearing of the advance of the Afridi *lashkar*, he had written to Sir Richard Udny, asking for a small detachment of regular troops, he being of opinion that this course would encourage the Khaibar Rifles, by making them feel that they had Government support behind them. But before this letter arrived, Sir Richard had already despatched an order to Captain Barton to return to Jamrud ; as, in the event of an attack upon Landi Kotal, the Commissioner considered that his presence there might hamper the action of Government to the extent of committing it to the despatch of a relief force for his rescue.

The garrisons at Ali Musjid and Fort Maude were now strengthened by 100 tribesmen each; and urgent orders were issued to the Zakha Khel *maliks* to reinforce Landi Kotal with

"K" Battery, R. H. A.
No. 3 Mountain Battery.
4th Dragoon Guards.
Wing of the Gordons (386 men).
7 companies, 2-1st Gurkhas (732 men).
Wing, 26th Punjab Infantry (280 men).

contingents; the Shinwari *maliks* were also reminded of their responsibility for the safety of the Pass, and on the early morning of the 18th, a column, as shown in the margin, was despatched to Jamrud; Bara Fort being at the same time strengthened by the addition of one com-

pany, 2-1st Gurkhas, and fifty men of the 9th Bengal Lancers.

Two or three days passed away without anything happening. On his way down the Khaibar, Captain Barton had seen no signs of any gathering; *kafilas* were passing up and down the Pass as usual without meeting the *laskhar*; and the Commissioner at last began to think that either he had been misled by exaggerated rumours, or that the Afridis, overawed by the display of force, had abandoned all idea of an attack upon the Khaibar posts.

On the 21st, reliable news was obtained that the Afridi *laskhar* of 10,000 men had really moved, with the intention of attacking the Khaibar posts if held by Government troops; but that, if they were held by the Khaibar Rifles alone, they would only attack Jamrud

and Bara. To meet this eventuality, Attack on the Khaibar posts.

Bara and Jamrud were both still further reinforced, the former by two squadrons, 9th Bengal Lancers, the 57th Field Battery, and a wing, 30th Punjab Infantry; the latter by a wing of the Gordons and a wing of the 28th Bombay Pioneers. Any active operations into the Khaibar were rendered impossible by scarcity of transport, all transport immediately available having been requisitioned for military operations in progress in other parts of the frontier. The transport on this date in the Peshawar valley consisted of only 553 camels, 714 mules, and 190 bullocks, most of which were required for the supply of the troops at Shabkadar, Bara, and Jamrud, and for various station duties.

In the early morning of the 23rd, the attack on the Khaibar posts began. On that date, the distribution of the Khaibar Rifles was as follows:—Jamrud, 271; Bagiar, 13; Jehangira, 7; Fort Maude, 42 (reinforced by 100 tribesmen); Ali Musjid, 80 (reinforced by 100 tribesmen, only 40 of whom were present at the time of

attack); Kata Kushtia, 7: Gurgura, 10: Landi Kotal, 374; Fort Tyler, 20. Fort Maude, the nearest important post to British territory, was the first to be seriously attacked; this was probably due to the Afridis, hearing on their arrival of the strength of the garrisons then in Jamrud and Fort Bara, having wisely abandoned their first intention of attacking these places, and diverted their attention to the easier task of attacking the Kliaibar posts.

At about 8 A.M., Brig.-General Westmacott, who had been appointed to command at Jamrud, heard that firing had been going on at Ali Musjid since early morning; and shortly afterwards news arrived that the bulk of the Afridi forces had moved off to Fort Maude, the attack on which began in earnest about 10 A.M. Soon after 3 P.M., hearing that the latter place was being pressed, General Westmacott moved out, as a demonstration, to Bagiar, at the entrance to the Pass, whence "K" Battery opened fire on the enemy near Fort Maude, over 3,000 yards distant.

This action quickly caused the retirement of the attacking force; but no sooner had the troops been withdrawn than the garrison evacuated the post, which was at once seized and destroyed by the enemy. The Bagiar and Jehangira posts were evacuated at the same time. Of the Fort Maude garrison, eleven Zakha Khels deserted with their rifles; the remainder came into Jamrud.

Ali Musjid was next attacked. By 7 P.M., the garrison, finding their ammunition was running out, and seeing that Fort Maude had fallen, escaped to Jamrud, with a loss of two killed and one wounded; the enemy's loss being estimated at twelve killed. Nineteen of the garrison, with their rifles, were missing.

On the morning of the 24th, the *lashkar*, which had passed the night at Ali Musjid, started for Landi Kotal, the garrisons of the small posts at Kata Kushtia and Gurgura taking to the hills on their approach. As the *lashkar* marched up the Pass, it was joined by all the neighbouring villagers, and, arriving at Landi Kotal about 8 A.M., began the attack forthwith.

Subadar Mursil Khan commanded the fort. Subadar-Major Mir Akbar was also present, but did not assume command, as he was there as the representative of his father, the Zakha Khel Malik Khwas Khan, and not in his military capacity. Khwas Khan had already joined the *lashkar*, and sent word to his son to admit him—

which he eventually succeeded in doing. All through the 24th and the ensuing night the defence was resolutely maintained ; but in the early morning of the 25th, urged by their fellow clansmen outside, the Shinwaris of the garrison, who numbered about seventy men, jumped down from the northern wall of the fort and made for their homes, being fired upon by some other tribesmen of the garrison as they went. A nephew of Khwas Khan now appeared, waving a flag of truce. On being admitted to the fort, he stated that he was authorized to make terms, and informed the garrison that the British had abandoned Jamrud, and that it was doubtful if they could hold Peshawar. The native officers, knowing that Forts Maude and Ali Musjid had fallen without any attempt to relieve them, and believing themselves abandoned to their fate, decided to make terms; and agreed to evacuate the fort on the understanding that the *lashkar* would move from the vicinity till evening.

Subadar-Major Mir Akbar now ordered "cease fire" to be sounded, and the garrison to pack their baggage. As they quitted the walls to do so, some Zakha Khels and Shinwaris from outside sealed the low bastion at the north-east corner of the fort and began to loot; the rest of the *lashkar*, which had begun to move away, swarming back to their assistance. The garrison at once manned the walls again, and Subadar Mursil Khan himself proceeded to the north-east corner and cleared the enemy out, but was unfortunately shot dead whilst doing so. Mir Akbar then divided the reserve ammunition amongst his own following, who numbered about fifty men, and released two Zakha Khels who had been made prisoners.

All was now confusion inside the fort, and about 11 A.M. the end came, the gate being opened from within, and the *lashkar* swarming into the post. The Mullagori and Shilmani sepoy, numbering about ninety men, fought their way out, and escaped to the Shilmani country, with a loss of two killed and two wounded; the remainder of the garrison joined the *lashkar*. The post was then looted and burnt. Of the garrison, one native officer, five sepoy and nine followers were killed, one native officer and six sepoy wounded. The losses of the enemy were said to be from 200 to 250.

In spite of all that their *mullas* could do to keep them together, the tribesmen then began to disperse to their homes, carrying their dead and wounded, while picquets of the Zakha Khels guarded the approaches from Jamrud.

During September, 134 of the garrison of Landi Kotal rejoined at Jamrud with their rifles; but, at the end of that month, of the 836 rifles in the hands of the corps, 274 were still unaccounted for. All men of the corps who rejoined were disarmed and given leave to their homes, while pensions were bestowed on the families of those who had died fighting on our side.

On the 3rd September, orders were issued for the concentration of troops for an advance into Tirah. But the extremely difficult nature of the country to be invaded, the formidable extent of the hostile combination against Government, their armament, and the transport difficulty already mentioned, all made it evident that no forward movement could take place until very extensive

preparations had been made. Still, notwithstanding the fact that the expedition promised to be a larger and more difficult military operation than any that had previously taken place on the frontier, Government had determined that it should take place, even though the tribes might show a disposition to submit before it began. This unprovoked aggression on the part of the Afridis and Orakzais had, in the opinion of the Government, created a situation so grave and so subversive of our dominant position on the frontier, that nothing short of humbling the pride of the tribesmen by dictating our own terms in the heart of their country would meet the occasion. It was also regarded as a matter of primary importance that the punitive operations should take place with as little delay as possible; *his dat qui cito dat* being peculiarly applicable in punitive measures against Pathans.

By starting our operations in the late autumn we could not hope to do the same amount of material damage to the enemy as would be the case were the expedition deferred until the spring, when the crops, being young, could not be cut in anticipation of our approach; moreover, by waiting till the spring we should have avoided exposing our troops to the hardships of a rigorous winter. But the necessity of striking at once outweighed all other considerations, and every possible endeavour was made

to hurry on the preparations, so as to get the expedition over before the most severe cold should set in. The 12th October was originally fixed upon as the date for the expedition to start, it being hoped that all might be ready by then, and that the conclusion of operations in Bajaur and the Mohmand country would set free large numbers of troops and transport animals for use in Tirah. These operations, however, proved longer than anticipated; and only one brigade with its transport, instead of two, became available from the troops under Sir Bindon Blood's command.

It was decided to make Kohat, and not Peshawar, the base of operations, for the following reasons:—The Kohat route was shorter: Shinawari, our advanced base, would be only thirty miles from Maidan, whereas Peshawar was over sixty, and the road, though difficult, was better than anything we could use from the Peshawar side; the roads into Tirah along the courses of the Bara, Mastura, and Khanki rivers, were known to be in places unfit even for mule transport, and to contain most difficult defiles, defensible by an almost inaccessible enemy, against whom we should have great difficulty in protecting our long line of communications; finally, it was hoped that at either the Sampagha or Arhanga pass, their two really strong and defensible positions, the enemy would make a resolute stand, and enable a decisive victory to be obtained, instead of successively occupying one strong position after another, after having taken each of which we should be obliged to wait again until the road behind was made practicable for transport. The main objection to the Kohat route lay in the fact of there being no railway nearer than Kushalgarh, on the Indus, over thirty miles to the east of Kohat.

The total force assembled for the invasion of Tirah was about 44,000 fighting men, details of which, with the staff, will be found in the Appendix. Lieut.-General Sir William Lockhart, Commanding the Punjab, was appointed to the supreme command. He was on furlough in England at the time, and was recalled by telegram. The troops were divided into a main column, consisting of two divisions, each composed of two brigades of infantry with divisional troops, and two subsidiary columns; besides troops to hold the lines of communications, and a mixed brigade held in reserve at Rawalpindi. The main column, under the personal command of Sir William

Distribution of troops.

Lockhart, was intended for the actual invasion of Tirah, from Kohat, *viâ* the Sampagha and Arhanga passes: the two subsidiary columns, operating from Peshawar and along the Hangu-Thal-Parachinar line, respectively, were to support the advance of the main column in such manner as circumstances might require.

Pending the arrival of Sir William Lockhart, the actual preparations for the advance were made by Major-General Yeatman-Biggs. Sir William Lockhart did not reach Kohat until the 4th October.

Everything was now ready but the transport, which was a question of paramount difficulty. The very greatest exertions had to be made to improvise what was required, and officers were despatched to scour the Punjab in quest of camels, mules, bullock carts, ponies, pack-bullocks, and even donkeys. The total number of transport animals in use by Government for the purposes of the Tirah Expedition reached, in round numbers, nearly 60,000, in addition to some 12,000 to 13,000 in use with other expeditions proceeding simultaneously on the frontier. From Kushalgarh to Shinawari, *viâ* Kohat and Muhammad Khwaja, the road was practicable for carts; but for the invasion of Tirah, nothing but pack transport could accompany the troops actually entering the country: and, camel transport being too slow and cumbersome, mules, ponies, and donkeys were alone suitable.

Whilst the necessary troops, supplies, and transport were being collected, no military operations of importance against the Afridis were undertaken. Such preliminary measures as were necessary against the Orakzais will be found detailed in Chapter IV. Some

skirmishing between our reconnoitring parties and the enemy occurred in October. On the 1st, near Sadda in the Kuriam, a patrol of the 3rd Bengal Cavalry was ambuscaded, a duffadar being killed and two sowars severely wounded: whether their assailants were Afridis or Orakzais did not transpire. On the 10th Captain Jones and a corporal, 4th Dragoon Guards, were killed whilst reconnoitring the Sam Ghakhe pass, three miles from Jamrud, towards Kajurai. On the 18th, two squadrons, 9th Bengal Lancers, under Captain Brazier-Creagh, reconnoitring up the Barn valley towards Mamanai, were ambuscaded on their return by 500 Aka Khel Afridis and Sturi Khel Orakzais, losing one non-commissioned officer, four sowars and eighteen horses

killed, four sowars and ten horses wounded, and four sowars missing. In addition to the above, sniping into camp and cutting of telegraph wires was, as usual, indulged in by the hostile tribesmen.

By the 16th October the concentration of the main column on the Hangu-Shinawari line was far enough advanced to enable Sir William Lockhart to decide on moving into the Khankri valley on the 20th, and to issue his orders to that effect.

As a preliminary to this advance arrangements were made to improve the road leading from Shinawari over the Chagru Kotal towards Kharappa, so as to make it fit for transport. By the 15th October this work had been completed to the top of the pass; but as further work was necessary on the north side of the *kotal*, it became necessary to dislodge the enemy from the village of Dargai and the ridges in the vicinity, from which they could open effective fire on our working-parties as soon as the latter crossed the summit.

Accordingly, Sir Power Palmer, who, in the temporary absence of Major-General Yeatman-Biggs, had succeeded to the command at Shinawari, arranged to move out to the attack in the early morning of the 18th October.

The troops detailed for the attack were distributed into two

Main Column.

1st Bn. Gordon Highlanders.
1st „ Dorset Regiment.
1st „ 2nd Gurkhas.
15th Sikhs.
No. 4 Co. Madras S. and M.
No. 8 M. B., R. A.
Machine Gun Det. 16th Lers.
Scouts, 5th Gurkhas.

2nd Column.

2nd Battalion K. O. S. B.
1st „ 3rd Gurkhas.
No. 5 M. B., R. A.
Rocket Detachment R. A.

columns as detailed in the margin. The main column, under the command of Brig.-General F. J. Kempster, was accompanied by Sir Power Palmer in person, and the 2nd Column was under the command of Brig.-General R. Westmacott. In addition, one company 3rd Sikhs accompanied Sir Power Palmer as personal escort. Sir William Lockhart

watched the operations from the vicinity of the Samana Sukh.

The main column left Shinawari Camp at 4-30 A.M. It was directed to proceed up a long rugged spur on the north-west of Shinawari, and then to execute a turning movement against the right flank of the enemy in the vicinity of Dargai. The 2nd Column, which had been detailed for the frontal attack on Dargai from the Chagru Kotal, started at 5 A.M., and reached the latter place


without opposition at about 8-30 A.M., where it was joined by the 1st Battalion, Northamptonshire Regiment, and No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal

First capture of Dargai.

Artillery, who had marched that morning from Fort Lockhart to the Samana Sukh, to reconnoitre and protect the right flank of the advance up the defile. From the Chagru Kotal very few of the enemy were to be seen on the Dargai position; it was accordingly decided that the 2nd Column should at once advance against it. At 9 A.M. the advance began, 3rd Gurkhas leading, King's Own Scottish Borderers in support, Northamptons in reserve; two companies Northamptons being left as escort to the Mountain Batteries, which, from the *kotal*, covered the advance of the infantry with their fire. The enemy now began to show in ever-increasing numbers on the high cliffs south of Dargai, overlooking the line of advance of the troops; and as the leading infantry reached Mama Khan, fire was opened upon them from the heights. From Mama Khan, by deviating to the south of the spur along the top of which the track runs, the troops were covered for about 900 yards by a deep fold in the ground; but on arriving at the point marked B on the plan all cover for a further advance ceased.

The small plateau upon which the village of Dargai is situated terminates abruptly to the south in a line of almost sheer cliffs, the ascent of which is made by a track, which climbs up at a point where the cliff is more broken and shelving than elsewhere. Connecting this point with B is a narrow neck along which, as far as point A, there is no cover whatever. Point A is too close in under the cliffs to be reached by fire from the summit, and the neck here broadens out owing to the fall of debris from above. The summit, where the path crosses it, is about 250 feet above B; while a little to the west a steep rocky knoll rises another 150 feet.

At 11 A.M. the infantry opened fire from the point B. Under cover of their fire and that of the two batteries, the Gurkhas, advancing by alternate rushes, gained the dead ground at the foot of the cliffs; and, just before noon, closely supported by the King's Own Scottish Borderers, they swarmed up the steep ascent, and took the position, headed by Lieutenant W. G. L. Beynon. The enemy, who now had news of the advance of the strong column under Brig.-General Kempster on their right flank, made only a half-hearted stand against the assault, and fled north-west towards the Khanki valley, leaving twenty dead. The Narikh Sukh was then occupied by the British, and the defences round Dargai destroyed. Our losses amounted to two men killed and thirteen wounded.



(Sd.) H. A. HOLDICH, Lieut.,
The Cameroons,
26th October 1897.

No. 4,370-I., 1908.

to one officer and seven men killed, five officers and twenty-nine men wounded.

If it had been possible to hold the Dargai position, instead of returning from it, the heavy casualties incurred in retaking it two days later might have been avoided; but the difficulties of making adequate arrangements for holding it, at the late hour when the concentration of the two columns had been effected, appeared insurmountable. The nearest water was at Talao,—three miles distant—the road to which place was impassable for transport animals, and was commanded throughout its entire length by high rugged hills, upon which the enemy were then beginning to arrive in force. Dargai is over 6,000 feet high, and there was neither firewood nor warm clothing for the troops; nor, at that hour, could arrangements have been made for sending supplies of any kind to them, over a track all but impracticable for laden animals even in daylight. Besides this the force would have been exposed, throughout the night, to attack from vast numbers of the Afridis; and the losses which would certainly have been incurred then may be set against those which we suffered on the 20th.

The actual advance from Shinawari for the invasion of Tirah took place on the 20th, as previously arranged.

Second advance on Dargai As the enemy was known to have re-occupied the Dargai ridge in great force, and it was necessary to dislodge him from that position before the road north of the Chagru Kotal could be safely traversed by the transport of the force, the 3rd Sikhs, the Derbyshire Regiment, and No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery, were placed at the disposal of Major-General Yeatman-Biggs, in addition to the troops of the 2nd Division. On the previous day, Yeatman-Biggs had proposed that, owing to the return of the Afridis to Dargai, the advance should be made to Kharappa *via* Fort Gulistan, the Samana Sukh, and the Talai spur, instead of down the Chagru defile, thus turning the enemy's position; and orders had been issued on the night of the 19th to this effect. Sir W. Lockhart, however, was unable to accept this change in his plans, and about midnight Yeatman-Biggs was directed to adhere to the original plan of movement. Sir William Lockhart considered that the enemy would probably retire from Dargai as soon as troops had been pushed on to the junction of the Narikh and Chagru ravines

as their flanks would then be threatened. In the end, however, troops were not advanced beyond the Chagru Kotal until the Dargai heights had been taken by a frontal attack.

Further to distract the enemy's attention and weaken his defence at Dargai, a report, given out as a dead secret to natives whom he knew would divulge it, was circulated by Mr. Donald, Political Officer, to the effect that a flanking attack would be made along the line taken by the main column on the 18th. Under the impression that they had obtained reliable information of our intentions, a large contingent of the enemy remained out on their right flank all day on the 20th, and gave no assistance to the tribesmen in front of Dargai, at the actual point of attack.

At 4-30 A.M. on the 20th, the advanced guard moved off,

Advanced Guard.

3rd Gurkha Scouts.
1-2nd Gurkhas.
1st Battalion Dorsets.
No. 4 Company Madras Sappers and Miners.
No. 8 Mountain Battery.
No. 5 Mountain Battery.
Maxim Gun Detachment, 16th Lancers.
1st Battalion Gordons.
15th Sikhs.

Main Body.

No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery.
2nd Battalion Derbyshire.
3rd Sikhs.
21st Madras Pioneers.
Sirmur Imperial Service Sappers.
Rocket Battery Jhind Infantry.

Rear-guard.

K. O. S. Borderers.
3rd Gurkhas.

followed by the remainder of the troops, as per margin; the baggage train was immediately in rear of the main body. The block on the road, however, due to the check caused by the enemy's opposition, was so great that the rear-guard was not able to get out of Shinawari Camp by nightfall.

The advanced guard, under Brig.-General Kempster, reached the Chagru Kotal about 8 A.M., without opposition; No. 9 Mountain Battery, escorted by the Northhamptons, who were to protect the right flank, arriving in position on the Samana Sukh at the same hour. The enemy, with whom twenty-nine standards were counted, were in great strength at Dargai and Narikh Sukh, and on the hills

to the west. A reliable spy brought information that they included Ali Khel, Mamuzai, and Alisherzai Orakzais and Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Kamrai, Zakha Khel, Sipah, and Kuki Khel Afridis. Subsequent information put the gathering at over 12,000 men, more than half of them Afridis.

At about 9 A.M., Major-General Yeatman-Biggs, arriving at the head of the main body, ordered Brig.-General Kempster to clear the Dargai ridge. The rest of the troops and baggage were meanwhile

halted, as the enemy's fire commanded the line of advance. The infantry detailed for the attack were ordered to advance by the route taken by Brig.-General Westmacott's Brigade on the 18th, and moved off at 9-30 A.M., the 1-2nd Gurkhas and 1-3rd Gurkha scouts in 1st Line, Dorsets support, and Derbyshires in reserve. The Gordons and Maxim detachment were ordered to support the attack by long-range fire at about 1,100 yards, from the Mama Khan ridge; whilst Nos. 1, 5 and 8 Mountain Batteries, massed at Madhu Gurhi on the northern slope of the Chagru Kotal (range 1,800 yards), and No. 9 Mountain Battery at Samana Sukh (range 3,300 yards), afforded the artillery preparation. At 10 A.M., the artillery opened an accurate and well-sustained fire, which enabled the troops to form up behind cover about 500 yards from the cliffs, with the exposed neck, B to A, in front of them. At 11-45 A.M., the Gurkha scouts, led by Lieutenant Tillard, and a portion of the 1-2nd Gurkhas, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Travers, dashed out from under cover and made for the nearest broken ground 100 yards away towards the cliffs.

The enemy had evidently been waiting for this moment, and instantly poured an extremely rapid and accurate fire upon the exposed space. Undaunted by the heavy casualties sustained by the first party, a second rush was made by the Gurkhas, led by Major Judge, who was shot through the head, neck, and chest just before reaching cover. A third rush was led by Captain Robinson, who reached cover with a wound in his ankle. Seeing that all available cover to the west was fully occupied, Captain Robinson now returned to point out a more sheltered line of advance on the east, and was mortally wounded in so doing.

When the Gurkhas attempted to advance beyond the point they had now reached, they came under a heavy flanking fire from the cliffs to the west, in addition to the fire from the front, and further advance was completely checked. Some attempts were made by small parties to rush forward; but the fire was annihilating. Up to this the Gurkhas had lost three officers and over fifty men; the Dorsets, accordingly, at about 2-15 P.M., advanced in support. Captain Arnold of that regiment, followed by a small party from his company, attempted to rush across the fire-swept zone, but fell dangerously wounded, almost every man with him being also hit. Lieutenant Hewitt then tried to lead a few Dorsets

across : with the exception of their leader, who got across with a graze, all the party was accounted for by the Afridis. Small parties of Dorsets and Derbyshires continued to try to rush across the ridge, but the proportion of casualties was very high, between forty and fifty of the Dorsets and a dozen or so of the Derbys being hit in these attempts.

Meanwhile small groups of the enemy, from the Khanki valley, had crept round and opened fire on the troops on our right on the Samana Sukh, but were driven off by the 36th Sikhs under Licut.-Colonel Haughton, who had reinforced that flank from the Samana.

At about 2-20 P.M., Major-General Yeatman-Biggs received a heliogram from Licut.-Colonel Piercy, commanding the Dorsets, that further advance was impossible without reinforcements. Brig.-General Kempster was then directed to order up the Gordons and 3rd Sikhs to the scene of action, a wing of the 21st Madras Pioneers taking the place of the Gordons at Mama Khan, and the Jhind Infantry becoming escort to the guns at the *kotal*. Arrangements were made with the artillery to open a rapid concentrated fire, on a given signal, to be maintained for three minutes ; at the end of which the Gordons would assault the position.

At 2-45 P.M., on the conclusion of this artillery preparation, Licut.-Colonel Mathias, commanding the Gordons, communicated the General's order to his men, and gave the word to attack. Headed by Licut.-Colonel Mathias, the pipers playing, the leading party of the Gordons dashed across the exposed space, followed by the rest of the regiment, by the 3rd Sikhs, and by all the other troops in the position, the whole swarming up the steep slope without a pause. The enemy did not await the final assault, but fled in all directions towards the Khanki valley, followed by long range valleys from the troops. Their losses would have been heavier but for the skilful construction of the *sangars*, which were in some cases provided with head-cover of stones and beams of wood.

For his gallant leading and splendid example on this occasion, Licut.-Colonel Mathias was recommended for the Victoria Cross, the same distinction being conferred upon Lance-Corporal Milne, who headed the pipers, upon Piper Findlater, for continuing

to play when shot through the feet and unable to stand, and upon Private Lawson—all of the Gordons. Lieutenant Pennell, Derbyshire Regiment, and Private Vickery were also awarded the Victoria Cross.

The British casualties on this occasion amounted to 4 officers and 34 men killed, 14 officers and 147 men wounded. Major-General Yeatman-Biggs published a complimentary order the following morning, in which he made special allusion to the conduct of the Gordons; and Her Majesty the Queen was graciously pleased to send the following telegram, which was published in Force Orders:—

Balmoral, 22nd October 1897.

Please express my congratulations to all ranks, British and Native troops, on their gallant conduct in actions 18th and 20th. Deeply deplore loss of precious lives among officers and men of my army. Pray report condition of wounded, and assure them of my true sympathy.

No further advance towards Kharappa being possible that evening, the following dispositions were made for the night. The Dargai heights were held by the Dorsets, Derbys, and 3rd Sikhs, the ridge by the Gordons, the Samana Sukh by the 21st Madras Pioneers. The rest of the troops bivouacked on or near the Chagru Kotal; except the Northamptons, 36th Sikhs, and No. 9 Mountain Battery, who all returned to the Samana forts.

The night of the 20th-21st having passed without any event of note, the advance was resumed on the 21st; Brig.-General Westmacott, with the marginally named troops, moving off at 9-30 A.M. The Dargai heights were held by the Derbys and 3rd Sikhs; and no opposition was met with until the Khanki river was reached, when a few shots were fired. Camp was pitched on the left bank of the river, in a position of considerable natural strength.

During the afternoon Sir William Lockhart, with the troops as per margin, joined at Kharappa, marching *viâ* Fort Cavagnari and the Talai spur. The track was so bad that the last of the baggage of this column did not reach camp until midday on the 23rd. Very little of the baggage

Advanced Guard
15th Sikhs.
No. 8 Mountain Battery.
Main Body
No. 5 Mountain Battery.
Gordon Highlanders.
Blind Infantry.

No. 9 Mountain Battery.
Northampton Regt.
36th Sikhs.
No. 3 Company, Bombay
Sappers and Miners

of Brig.-General Kempster's force arrived on the night of the 21st; its security being provided for by parking at the village of Taikhana, in the Chagru valley, all transport which had not passed that point by 6 P.M. No attack was made on the troops or transport in the Chagru valley, either on this occasion or subsequently, though a good deal of firing into Kharappa camp took place this night,—an attempt to rush the west side of the camp being repelled without casualties on our side.

No forward move was made from Kharappa until the 28th, the intervening time being occupied by road-making, strengthening camps on the line of communications, completing the concentration of troops and supplies, and daily foraging operations up and down the Khanki river. On the 22nd a reconnaissance towards the Sampagha found that pass held by about 1,000 men with four standards. On the 24th Brig.-General R. Hart, v.c., assumed command of the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, in

No. 1 Mountain Battery.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ Battalion Devonshire Regt.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ Battalion Derby. Regt.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ Battalion 2-1st Gurkhas.

place of Brig.-General I. Hamilton, who had broken his leg. On the 25th a foraging party, as shown in the margin, under Lieut.-Colonel Yule (Devons), which

had gone $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles up the Khanki valley, was attacked by large numbers of the enemy when retiring; and, although reinforced, they were followed up closely, and by 4-30 P.M. the enemy were firing into camp, causing many casualties amongst troops and transport animals. Captain F. F. Badcock, D.S.O., 1-5th Gurkhas, was dangerously, and Lieutenant G. D. Crocker, Royal Munster Fusiliers, slightly wounded, both from this sniping. In addition to these officers, our total losses on this date were one man killed and thirty-six wounded, thirteen of these casualties having occurred during the retirement of the foraging party. In consequence of the losses caused by this sniping, picquets, in strong *sangars*, were placed on all the neighbouring heights the next morning, with excellent results.

On the 28th, the force, which in round numbers now amounted to 17,600 fighting men, an almost equal number of followers, and 24,000 animals, marched to Ghandaki. Moving out at 5 A.M. the Northamptons and 36th Sikhs, under Lieut.-Colonel Chaytor, seized the heights north of Khangarbur, which commanded the line of advance. The rest of the troops marched in two columns,

as their flanks would then be threatened. In the end, however, troops were not advanced beyond the Chagru Kotal until the Dargai heights had been taken by a frontal attack.

Further to distract the enemy's attention and weaken his defence at Dargai, a report, given out as a dead secret to natives whom he knew would divulge it, was circulated by Mr. Donald, Political Officer, to the effect that a flanking attack would be made along the line taken by the main column on the 18th. Under the impression that they had obtained reliable information of our intentions, a large contingent of the enemy remained out on their right flank all day on the 20th, and gave no assistance to the tribesmen in front of Dargai, at the actual point of attack.

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Advanced Guard.

3rd Gurkha Scouts.
1-2nd Gurkhas.
1st Battalion Dorsets.
No. 4 Company Madras Sappers and Miners.
No. 8 Mountain Battery.
No. 5 Mountain Battery.
Maxim Gun Detachment, 16th Lancers.
1st Battalion Gordons.
15th Sikhs.

Main Body.

No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery.
2nd Battalion Derbyshire.
3rd Sikhs.
21st Madras Pioneers.
Sirmur Imperial Service Sappers.
Rocket Battery Jhind Infantry.

Rear-guard.

K. O. S. Borderers.
3rd Gurkhas.

followed by the remainder of the troops, as per margin; the baggage train was immediately in rear of the main body. The block on the road, however, due to the check caused by the enemy's opposition, was so great that the rear-guard was not able to get out of Shinawari Camp by nightfall.

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to the west. A reliable spy brought information that they included Ali Khel, Mamuzai, and Alisherzai Orakzais and Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Kamrai, Zakha Khel, Sipah, and Kuki Khel Afridis. Subsequent information put the gathering at over 12,000 men, more than half of them Afridis.

At about 9 A.M., Major-General Yeatman-Biggs, arriving at the head of the main body, ordered Brig.-General Kempster to clear the Dargai ridge. The rest of the troops and baggage were meanwhile

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was reported by Sir William Lockhart as the steepest and worst yet encountered. Whilst the 4th Brigade, under cover of the artillery fire (which was shortly reinforced by the three batteries of the 1st Division), moved directly against the front of the position, the 2nd Brigade marched up a ravine to the east of the pass to attack the enemy's left, and the 3rd Brigade on the west threatened their right. Very little opposition was offered, and before 10 A.M. the whole position was in our hands. Our losses in this engagement were Captain C. T. A. Searle, 36th Sikhs, and one man, 3rd Sikhs wounded, and one driver, No. 8 Mountain Battery, killed.

The hills on the far side, commanding the pass, having been secured and picqueted, the advance to Maidan was resumed, camp being reached by the advanced guard about 3 P.M., without opposition. Every effort was made to hurry forward the transport during daylight, and strong escorts accompanied the baggage; but in spite of this, an attack was made on the column at about 9 P.M., during which three drivers were killed and two wounded, and two boxes of Martini-Henry ammunition were lost. On the following night the enemy again made a daring and successful attack on a convoy, capturing thirteen boxes of Lee-Metford ammunition and a treasure chest of "The Queen's," and inflicting a loss of three men killed and three wounded on the small escort. After this, no baggage was allowed out of Mastura camp after 3 P.M.

From Camp Maidan, on the morning after the capture of the

K. O. S. Borderers.

1-3rd Gurkhas.

No. 8 Mountain Battery.

Arhanga pass, the marginally named force marched at 10 A.M., under Lieut.-Colonel H. G. Dixon, C.B., King's Own Scottish Borderers, to Bagh, about three miles west of camp; this being the political centre of Tirah, and the meeting place of the Afridi *jirgas*. The mosque, being a sacred edifice, was not touched by our troops, but the small grove of trees surrounding it was destroyed. In the afternoon, a large body of the enemy having been seen moving down from the Saran Sar hill, north-east of camp, to obtain supplies from their deserted houses, a force was sent out to oppose them. In the slight skirmish which ensued, Lieutenant E. G. Caffin, Yorkshire Regiment, was severely wounded.

On the 2nd November, a telegram was received from Her Majesty the Queen, containing congratulations on the capture of the Sampagha pass, and enquiries for the wounded.

Upon our arrival in Maidan, the Political Officers with the force had sent out in all directions to summon the tribes to send in their *jirgas*, informing them that it was only by accepting the terms imposed by Government that they could hope to escape further ruin and destruction of property. During the first week of November, negotiations were opened with most of the Afridi clans, though it was some time longer before they submitted.

Little or no trouble had, however, been given by the Orakzais during our advance, subsequent to the actions at Dargai; and it was evident that they had no more fight in them. On the 12th November they accepted our terms of peace; by the 20th, they had paid up the whole fine imposed on them both in rifles and money; and except that it was still considered advisable to watch them, they did not further affect the course of the campaign. Of the Afridi clans, the Zakha Khel were irreconcilably hostile, and succeeded in forcing the Aka Khel, a weaker and far less numerous tribe, to adopt the same attitude.

Meanwhile, skirmishes and attacks on convoys were of almost daily occurrence. Fighting was, however, confined to the immediate vicinity of the main column, the whole of the long line of communications (now 100 miles, from Kushalgarh to Maidan) being unmolested, with the exception of the section north of Mastura. Foraging parties were almost invariably fired on, and camp was constantly sniped at night, Captain E. Y. Watson of the Commissariat, and Lieutenant C. L. Gifford of the Northhamptons being killed, and Captain E. L. Sullivan, 36th Sikhs, severely wounded by this desultory fire, besides drivers and transport animals.

The first serious action, after Maidan was entered, occurred on the 9th, during the reconnaissance of Saran Sar, a pass into the Bara valley, at a height of about 2,500 feet above camp Maidan. To make a thorough survey of this pass; which was about five miles from camp, and to punish the Zakha Khels by destroying

their villages, a reconnaissance in force by the troops shown in the margin, under Brig.-General Westmacott, moved out about 7 A.M. The crest of the *kotal* was reached about 11-30 A.M. after a sharp skirmish, in which the enemy suffered severely and the Northhamptons and Dorsets lost two or three men wounded. The retirement began about two o'clock in the afternoon, the defences of a large number of Khusrogi Zakha Khel villages having been first destroyed and their stores of grain and forage carried off.


No. 8 Mountain Battery. in the margin, under Brig.-General
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 Zakha Khel villages having been first destroyed and their stores
 of grain and forage carried off.

At the time the retirement began, not an Afridi was visible, nor did any appear until the Northhamptons, who were covering the retirement, had left the crest of the hill and were well on their way down. But the enemy, following their usual practice, had meantime been creeping up unseen from every side; and a close and heavy fire was suddenly opened, one of the Northhamptons being killed and some half a dozen wounded. As the ground was too steep and difficult for stretchers, each man who was hit required four men to carry him down the craggy cliffs: a process which was not only exceedingly slow and tiring, but also exposed the carriers to further casualties. At 4 P.M. the 36th Sikhs, under Lieut.-Colonel Haughton, were ordered some way back to assist the Northhamptons, now encumbered with ten or twelve wounded, and to take over the rear-guard duties. At the foot of the hill the 36th overtook the Northhamptons, and again halted to cover their further retirement. The ground from here back to camp is much intersected by deep *nalas*. The Northhamptons had originally advanced along the bed of the main *nala*; and, considering it the quickest and easiest way to transport their wounded back to camp, they decided to retire by the same route. When Lieut.-Colonel Haughton heard that they were fairly started, assuming that they were in line and touch with the Dorsets and the two companies 15th Sikhs, who were protecting the right flank, he withdrew across the open country, keeping clear of the main ravine, his regiment having been detailed to protect the left flank of the retirement. In the gathering darkness the different companies of the Northhamptons now lost touch of one another and of the flanking troops; the

12th November 1907.
 2nd Division
 Field Intelligence Officer.
 E. WATKINS, Captain.
 From a sketch by—

(24) G. H. Moxon-Monro, Colonel,
 1st Lt. Col. Genl. for Intelligence
 Trench Expeditionary Force

No. 1300-



by sketching various details in pencil
 to show the general appearance of the
 country as seen from the camp

coerced the Aka Khels, numbering not above 1,800 fighting men, comparatively poorly armed, and quite willing to accept terms, into following their lead. To overawe the Aka Khels and detach them, if possible, from their alliance with the Zakha Khels, and also to punish the Zya-ud-Din Zakha Khels by destroying their

No. 8 Mountain Battery	village defences near the Tseri Kandao,
No. 5 " "	a force as per margin. under Brig.-
1st En Gordon Highlanders	General Kempster, left Camp Maidan on
1st " Dorset Regiment	the 13th, and encamped in an open
1-2nd Gurkhas.	defensible site near the Sher Khel vil-
15th Sikhs	lages in the Waran valley. They met
36th " "	with no opposition on their way from
No. 4 Company, Madras	camp, communication with which was
Sapper- and Miners	maintained by the 36th Sikhs, detached to hold the Tseri
No. 1 Company, Bombay	Kandao. On the previous day, the Aka Khel <i>junga</i> had come
Sapper- and Miners	in, saying that their clan desired peace, and, that they had no

objection to the proposed reconnaissance of their valley. Opposition from them was consequently not anticipated; nor, until the 15th, was any offered, though large numbers of armed Aka Khels on the neighbouring hills watched the proceedings of our troops, which included the destruction of the house of the notorious Aka Khel *mulla*, Saiyid Akbar. During the evening of the 14th, however, numbers of Zakha Khels came over into the Waran valley, to incite the Aka Khels to fight. It was their intention, in any case, to sue into our camp from the Aka Khel villages, in the hope that we should lay the blame on the Aka Khels, and begin a wholesale destruction of the villages in the valley, thus goading the Aka Khels into opposition. This course of action on the part of the Zakha Khels had fortunately been foreseen by the Political Officer, and consequently, when, during the reconnaissance and subsequent retirement to camp on the 15th, we were attacked and followed up, the blame was apportioned in the right quarter, and the Aka Khel villages were not damaged.

The action of the Zakha Khels on this occasion may be compared to the similar course taken by the Boer irreconcilables after Lord Roberts' proclamation in the summer of 1900, when those who had determined to continue the fighting visited the districts of those who had surrendered, and forced them back on commando.

On the 16th, General Kempster with his force marched for Camp Maidan. The transport reached camp unmolested during the afternoon ; and the rear-guard, for the first mile and a half of the homeward journey, was also not attacked. The arrangements for the withdrawal of the rear-guard were as follows : the 36th Sikhs were to take up a position on the Maidan side of the pass, whilst the 15th Sikhs, who now relieved the above regiment on the summit, held the heights on either side of the Tseri Kandao until the rear-guard (consisting of the 1-2nd Gurkhas), had passed through them. The 15th Sikhs were then to take up the duties of rear-guard, passing in their turn through the 36th Sikhs, who would form the rear-guard for the rest of the march to Camp Maidan.

As the 1-2nd Gurkhas approached the pass, they were vigorously attacked in rear by ever-increasing numbers ; and by the time they had reached the *kotal* they had lost Lieutenant Wylie and three men killed, and four wounded. After they had passed through the 15th Sikhs, the latter regiment was disposed as follows :—two companies on the south of the pass ; two on the north of it ; and, further north again, two more companies, under Captain N. A. Lewarne and Lieutenant C. A. Vivian, who held the south edge of the pinewoods which covered the summits of the long spur running down from the Saran Sar. Lieut.-Colonel Abbott himself, with one company, held the actual *kotal* ; while the remaining company, under Captain G. F. Roweroft, was on a commanding spot 800 yards in rear, to cover the general retirement. These companies were all very weak from twenty to thirty men each.

The retirement was proceeding satisfactorily until it came to Captain Lewarne's turn. The moment he began to retire, a hot fire was opened on him from the wood above ; several men were immediately hit, and a large number of the enemy charged down upon him sword in hand. Waiting until they were close up, he opened a steady and rapid fire upon them ; and the other company under Lieutenant Vivian coming promptly to his assistance, the enemy were driven back with very heavy loss. It was, however, impossible, without incurring further heavy casualties, to remove the wounded from the *sangar*.

Meanwhile an attack in force had also been made upon Lieut.-Colonel Abbott in the main *sangar* below, where he had been

joined by several others of his companies. As he also had numerous wounded in his *sangar*, whom he could not get away without assistance, he signalled to Brig.-General Kempster to this effect; and the 36th Sikhs and two companies of Dorsets were immediately ordered back to his assistance. A detached company of the 36th, under Captain Custance, had, however, arrived already, and Lieut.-Colonel Haughton, 36th Sikhs, in anticipation of the order, was moving up with all he had been able to collect of his regiment. On his arrival he found both Colonel Abbott and Captain Custance wounded. He was shortly joined by Major Des Vœux, who brought up the remainder of the 36th and a weak company of the Dorsets, under Captain Hammond; the other company of the Dorsets having been posted in a house close by, which commanded the road. to cover the eventual retirement of the rear-guard. This company was under command of Lieutenant Crooke, Suffolk Regiment, with Lieutenant Hales, East Yorkshire Regiment, both attached to the Dorsets.

Under the heavy fire poured in by these reinforcements, the rear-guard was withdrawn to the foot of the hill without further casualties. The dead and wounded were then sent on to Camp Maidan, and the remainder of the troops halted to collect stragglers, it being now quite dark. The enemy now tried to cut off the whole of this little force, numbering only some 200 men; and they opened a withering fire from some ruined houses on the line of retreat, and also from every coign of vantage in the vicinity. Lieut.-Colonel Haughton instantly fixed bayonets and charged the houses, killing several of the enemy, and putting the remainder to flight; but the ruins, which had only been set on fire that morning, were too hot to occupy. In this charge the troops had become divided into two parties, part remaining under Haughton, the remainder under Des Vœux. Two companies under Major Des Vœux succeeded in finding a house which had cooled down enough to admit of it being occupied; but before the party under Lieut.-Colonel Haughton could throw up any defences, Captain Lewarne had been killed, and Lieutenant Munn (Adjutant, 36th Sikhs) and half a dozen men wounded. After a trying night Colonel Haughton rejoined Major Des Vœux at dawn, and began to retire on camp, the enemy contenting themselves with firing a few parting shots. The little

party was met by a relieving force and reached Camp Maidan in safety.

Meanwhile disaster had overtaken the Dorsets left behind under Lieutenants Crooke and Hales. What actually happened is never likely to be known; but it would appear that, hearing men on the road below, and believing them in the darkness to be Sikhs, they abandoned the house, and were instantly overwhelmed by the Afridis. Lieutenants Crooke and Hales and nine men were killed, and many others wounded; the remainder made their way back to camp, Lieutenant Hale's half company being brought in intact by the senior Sergeant.

Brig.-General Kempster, considering that to send any more troops back to the assistance of the Sikhs would only result in further confusion and loss in such intricate and difficult country, had arrived with the rest of his brigade in Camp Maidan about 8-30 P.M.

Our total casualties in this affair were four British officers and twenty-five men killed, three British and three Native officers and thirty-eight men wounded. The enemy's losses were estimated at 300. Zakha Khels, Aka Khels, Kamrai, and Sipah were reported to have taken part in the action. The Waran valley was subsequently visited on the 10th December and the Aka Khels severely punished.

Meanwhile, in Maidan, an attempt to establish more peaceable relations, by purchasing fodder from the Malikdin and Kambar Khels, had proved a failure, and was taken advantage of by the enemy to make treacherous attacks. Firing into camp also continued.

On the 17th, Sir William Lockhart addressed some of the troops in camp, giving useful hints for the conduct of the particular kind of mountain warfare in which the force was engaged. The substance of the remarks were published for general information and guidance on the 18th, and will be found in Appendix D.

On the 18th November, preparations were made to move the camp to Bagh. This step was considered advisable both from the political effect to be obtained from occupying the religious centre of the country, and from the strategical advantage of

being nearer to certain other districts, the Rajgul valley in particular, as yet unvisited by our troops.

On this day the only troops to move out were the 2nd Brigade and Divisional troops of the 1st Division under Major-General Symons. Under the impression that the movement was only for reconnaissance or foraging, and that their own opportunity would come later in the day, when the force began to retire, the tribesmen offered no serious opposition to the advance. But when they became aware, from our preparations, that it was intended to place a permanent camp at Bagh, they mustered in force and opened fire from every side, occupying towers and fortified houses, of which there were a large number in the vicinity. Some stubborn fighting ensued, our total losses for the day amounting to five killed, and a native officer and eighteen men wounded. The camp and picquets were heavily fired into throughout the night, and some transport animals were hit; the men, well entrenched, had no casualties.

During the 19th, 20th and 21st, all the stores at Camp Maidan, and the whole of the troops, were moved to the new camp.

On the 20th the 15th Sikhs, now reduced by casualties and sickness to a fraction of its original strength, was sent back to Shinawari, being considered too weak for duty. Their departure from the force was marked by a special complimentary order by Sir William Lockhart, in which he expressed in the warmest terms his appreciation of their gallantry and endurance.

The same day terms were made known to such of the *jirgas* as had come in, and proclamations setting forth the terms were also despatched to the clans who had not yet sent in their *jirgas*.

The terms were :—

A fine of Rs. 50,000.

Surrender of 800 breech-loading rifles.

Restoration of all Government Rifles and property.

Forfeiture of all allowances.

The tribes were given a week in which to comply with these terms. On their requesting that no more of their towers and fortifications should be destroyed pending their reply, they were informed that such measures would depend upon their own conduct,

but that if firing into camp and upon foraging parties ceased, their wishes would be met.

To punish the recalcitrant Kuki Khels, and to explore the approaches to the Bara valley with a view to future operations in that direction, Sir William Lockhart, with the troops named in the margin, under Brig.-General Westmacott, started on the 22nd for Dwa Toi, on a three-days' reconnaissance. The route lay along the difficult and dangerous Shaloba defile, about six miles in length.

King's Own Scottish Borderers.
1st Bn. Yorkshire Regiment.
36th Sikhs.
1-2nd Gurkhas.
1-3rd "
28th Bombay Pioneers.
No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
No. 4 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners.
No. 5 Mountain Battery.
Gurkha scouts.

Before dawn the two flanking battalions moved off to crown the heights on

either side of the defile, and remained there throughout the three days: the Yorkshires on the right bank, the 1-2nd Gurkhas on the left.

The main body marched at 9 A.M., but, owing to the difficulties of the route, they did not reach Dwa Toi until 4 P.M. On arriving at that place the 28th Pioneers, who formed the advanced guard, came under fire from the hills to the north, which they immediately stormed. Hardly any baggage got through to Dwa Toi that night, the bulk of it, on the approach of darkness, being parked and surrounded by strong picquets by Lieut.-Colonel Haughton, commanding the rear-guard.

The following day was spent in destroying Kuki Khel fortifications, and in improving the pathway, and, on the 24th, at day-break, the force started its return journey to Bagh. At that early hour the enemy were not yet astir, and all the picquets round camp were withdrawn without loss. The rear-guard was, however, soon hotly engaged. Some casualties having occurred amongst the 36th Sikhs, who again furnished it, a few hospital mules were sent back to bring on the less severely wounded. A number of the enemy made an attempt to carry off these mules, but were surprised and cornered in the river-bed by the 36th Sikhs, and suffered heavily. The flanking battalions on the heights, especially the 1-2nd Gurkhas, were also attacked during retirement, but neither they nor the Yorkshires had any casualties.

Our losses during these three days were:—one British officer and four men killed; two British officers and twenty-eight wounded.